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Abstract

In this thesis, I examine the political theories of Sir
Robert Filmer, John Locke, and James Tyrrell and, in turn,
compare their respective conceptions of property which are
at the foundation of their political theories.

This

political debate about property must be set amongst the
political circumstances of the exclusion crisis.

Arising

from the Whig-Tory division, which arose in part from the
Popish Plot, Filmer, Locke, and Tyrrell reveal the ideas of
the parties they represented.

Locke and Tyrrell, as Whig

representatives, refuted the patriarchal theory of Filmer's
Patriarcha, representative of the Tory party.

In refuting

Filmer, Locke and Tyrrell reveal the Whig movement from
arguments focusing on history to their acceptance of natural
law political theory.

As natural law theorists, there are

many similarities between the property theories of Locke and
Tyrrell as presented in the Two Treatises and Patriarcha non
Monarcha.

However, in contrast to Locke, Tyrrell presents a

definition of property which focuses on economic (and not
ideological) rights and claims that occupancy is a right to
property.

In addition, he presents an argument in which an

absolute monarchy can be accepted as legitimate, which Locke
would never accept.

I conclude that the work of James

Tyrrell is most representative of the period's political
debates and explain why.
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Introduction: The Exclusion Crisis, the Formation
of Political Party Ideologies, and Seventeenth-Century
Liberties
In October of 1678, the Cavalier Parliament
investigated a claim by Titus Oates that there was a Popish
Plot to assassinate the king, Charles II.

In the case of

the king's death, his Catholic brother, James, Duke of York,
would succeed to the throne.

The already strong English

fear of Catholicism ran rampant throughout the country in a
period which would come to be known as the Exclusion Crisis.
The Exclusion Crisis covered a period from 1678 to
1681, in which three Parliaments were called and convened.
All three of these parliaments were linked by exclusion
bills which, if they were passed, would have kept James from
succeeding to the throne.

Although exclusion had been

considered since at least the mid-1670s, an exclusion bill
was introduced in the first exclusion Parliament.1
Parliament was dissolved

After a

on January 24, 1679, a new

Parliament met for the first time on March 6, 1679,
introducing an exclusion bill in May.

Between these two

parliaments, the Duke of York was forced into exile, in part
because the Commons declared that Catholicism gave
encouragement to the plotters and insinuated that the Duke

1. Tim Harris, Politics Under the Later Stuarts: Party
Conflict in a Divided Society, 1660-1715 (New York, New
York:
Longman, 1993), 83.
1

may have been involved in the plot himself.

The first

exclusion parliament was porogued before the bill of
exclusion could go very far.
October 21, 1680.

Parliament met once again on

During this second exclusion parliament,

a similar exclusion bill reached the House of Lords, where
it was rejected in November.

A third exclusion parliament,

also known as the Oxford Parliament, met in 1681.

During

the Oxford Parliament, a third exclusion bill was read.
Once again, the bill failed.

From 1678 to 1681, a period

known as the Exclusion crisis, three parliaments met, each
introducing a bill of exclusion, all of which failed.
Despite the controversy over excluding the Duke of York
from succession to the throne, the period did not just
revolve around ideas of succession.

In Politics and Opinion

in Crisis, 1678-1681, Mark Knights argues that exclusion
implies the crisis was only parliamentary and would best be
reserved for the time from November 1680 to the dissolution
of the Oxford Parliament in 1681.

Indeed, he notes "the

depth and complexity of what was the critical period in
Charles II's reign, when politics and opinion were in
crisis."2

During the entire time span, contemporaries

perceived a crisis while the nation "drifted slowly towards
violent unrest. 11 3

Disorder was looming on the nation,

2. Mark Knights, Politics and Opinion in Crisis, 16781681 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press,
1994), 4-5.
3. Ibid. I 3.
2

centering on issues of dissent, the factioning of political
parties, and a fierce battle between notions of liberty and
tyranny.
During the exclusion crisis, modern political parties
were beginning to take shape.

While much attention has been

devoted to this period as a focal point for the arising of
political parties, especially the Whig party, Knights claims
that this attention has diverted scholars from the real
issues of the time.4

Rather than devoting so much attention

to the growth of political parties, historians should pay
more attention to the issues of conflict in England during
the late seventeenth century.

Tim Harris, for instance,

maintains a study of the period must emphasize what is new
to the time of the exclusion crisis, the depth of the
constitutional crisis and fears of arbitrary government.5
Despite these comments, many historians believe the
beginnings of modern political parties can be observed.
There was "a polarisation between two fairly-well identified
sides, both of which had distinct political ideologies and
possessed a rudimentary degree of organization," signalling
the emergence of political society during the exclusion
crisis.6

The Whig party and the Tory party emerged from the

4. Ibid., 5.
5. Harris, "'Lives, Liberties, and Estates': Rhetorics
of Liberty in the Reign of Charles II," The Politics of
Religion in Restoration England, ed. Tim Harris, Paul
Seaward, Mark Goldie (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Basil
Blackwell, 1990), 218.
6. Harris, Politics Under the Later Stuarts, 82.
3

·exclusion crisis.
In addition to the anti-catholicism of the supposed
Popish Plot, and the attempt to exclude a Catholic successor
from the throne, attitudes towards protestant dissent can be
seen as a strong issue between the two parties.

Like

succession and arbitrary government, however, dissent was
just one issue that
helped to divide the nation during the period and held
different sway at different times . . • all distorted
by local and personal factors, and . . . not very
useful to try to prioritize them in sweeping
generalizations.7
Concerns of the Popish Plot and fears of arbitrary
government led the Whigs to a heightened fear of papery.
The Whigs equated Catholicism with the reign of Mary
Tudor, England's last Catholic ruler, who had heretics
burned at the stake, and came to believe that a Catholic
ruler would necessarily be absolute, like Louis XIV of
France.a

The Whigs believed a Catholic ruler would be

absolute because the only way he would be able to force his
subjects to follow Rome would be to end the rule of law by
keeping a standing army.

The Whigs appeared

constitutionally conservative because they feared a Catholic
monarch would ruin a balance of power between king and
parliament.
Among the leaders of the constitutionally conservative

7. Knights, 365.
8. Harris, Politics Under the Later Stuarts, 86.
4

Whigs was the Earl of Shaftesbury.

Although Shaftesbury, a

proponent of exclusion, was not the leader of the Whigs, he
did hold several Whig clubs.9

By holding these clubs, the

Earl revealed his power of organization--a hallmark of
modern political parties.

He also had briefly been part of

the republican regimes of the 1650s, an indication that
leading constitutionally conservative Whigs must
be judged with wariness, for "it would have been a tactical
mistake for the exclusionists to admit that their real aim
was a fundamental restructuring of the powers of the
monarchy."10

As a supporter of the regimes of the

Interregnum, Shaftesbury revealed his belief in Parliament
as the representative of the people, whose acts were based
upon consent given by the people able to vote.11

Other than

his representation of the Whigs as believers in the
authority of Parliament and as an organized party,
Shaftesbury was very active in encouraging pope-burnings,
riots, and petitioning.

By encouraging these actions, he

demonstrated his leadership within the Whig party as a
populist party; a party which stood for the rights of the
English people against popery and arbitrary government.
The Tory party stood in opposition to the Whig party.
Essentially an anti-populist party, more elitist than the

9. Ibid., 84.
10. Ibid., 87.
11. Ibid., 89.
5

Whigs, the Tories opposed exclusion in opposition to the
Whigs, but were not as well organized as their rivals.12
Unlike the Whigs in another respect, the Tories did not have
anyone who stood out as a leader of their party and did not
see themselves as a party but as people fulfilling the
loyalty they owed to the Crown.13

Like the Whigs, who posed

as a party dedicated to the constitution, the Tories also
possessed a distinctive identity.

The Tory identity

"centered around an attachment to Church and State as by
law established. 11 14

Making conditional statements about

absolute monarchy, the Tories wanted the English people to
obey the legal government of England, even if that meant
obeying a Catholic ruler.
Although both the Whigs and Tories had distinct issues
which they supported, it is best not to look at the conflict
between these two parties during the Exclusion Crisis as one
between liberty and tyranny.

Although, as Knights suggests,

this distinction may be best "for those who espoused
polarized ideological positions," most members of either
party were not strictly Whiggish or Tory.15

In fact,

exclusion was not the dividing issue because a Whig-Tory
division, while describing the outcome of the crisis, was
not the dividing line, but a dividing line.16
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Ibid., 94, 101.
Ibid. I 95.
Ibid. I 96.
Knights, 358.
Ibid., 356.
6

They were not

in direct conflict because both parties believed in the
established Church and State.

The problem arose between the

two parties because, at a time when the line of succession
to the throne was being threatened, they could not reach a
consensus on as to what was the established Church and
State.

Although the Whigs made some concessions, including

the belief that the established church should be expanded to
include the moderate protestant dissenters, this was a
limited expansion.
remained at odds.

Neither party was all-inclusive; they
Generally speaking, the Whigs believed in

the constitution and the authority of Parliament, fearing
the results of a possible Catholic ruler, while the Tories
believed in the obedience the English owed to their monarch,
whether that monarch was catholic or not.

Historically, the

Whigs have since been seen as defenders of the propertied
class against a threat posed by arbitrary government and the
Tories have been seen as enemies of liberty, defenders of
divine right and succession.
It would be misleading to argue that the Whigs only
took a stance as defenders of liberty against the Tory
interest in defending an absolute monarchy.

As Tim Harris

explains, liberty was a concept which did not hold the same
meaning for all sectors of the population.

Both the Whigs

and the Tories held views of liberty: conflicting views.
Harris writes,

7

As

we cannot see the conflict of the 1680s in terms of a
simple struggle between liberty and tyranny, between
legal and arbitrary government. What we have are
competing conceptions of liberty, discrete visions of
how 'lives, liberties, and estates' were best secured.
These visions were inevitably worked out and defended
in terms of an appeal to the law, the ancient
constitution and Magna Carta and natural justice.17
By the late seventeenth century, both parties generally
agreed that Englishmen had rights which should be protected
by the government.

These rights included life, liberty, and

the protection of their property.
Property may have been the most important of the rights
which Englishmen felt the government needed to protect.
Property rights were important enough that everyone in
politics wanted to see them secured.18

Protection of

property rights would serve as a bridge to the security of
other rights; by the time of the exclusion crisis, all
liberties were considered part of a person's property.
John Cowell's definition of the word property, given in
the law dictionary The Interpreter, first appeared in 1607.
Cowell, Regius Professor of Civil Law in the University of
Cambridge, made an important contribution to political
science with his legal definition of property because it was
the "earliest explicit definition" of the word.19

His

17. Harris, "'Lives, Liberties, and Estates,"' 236.
18. Ibid. I 220.
19. G. E. Aylmer, "The Meaning and Definition of
'Property' in Seventeenth-Century England," Past and Present
86 (Feb. 1980): 87.
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definition was debated by Members of Parliament in 1610, the
first Parliament of James I.

G. E. Aylmer, in "The Meaning

and Definition of 'Property• in Seventeenth-Century
England," quotes cowell's definition:
Propertie signif ieth the highest right that a man hath
or can have to any thing; which is in no way depending
upon any other man's courtesie. And this none in our
kingdom can be said to have in any lands or tenements,
but only the king in the right of his crowne.20
After providing this explanation of the concept of property,
Cowell proceeded to explain in The Interpreter that the king
possessed the only property rights because lands of the
realm were held in fee.

Nevertheless, property was included

as a part of common law, used for "that right in lands and
tenements that common persons have. 11 21

The start which

Cowell gave to the definition of property began the
seventeenth century debate of the concept.
Cowell's definition of property established him as both
"the originator of the definition of absolute individual
ownership" and "a would-be absolutist. 11 22

His stance as an

absolutist can be seen when considering that Parliament
debated this definition during the reign of James I,
England's theorizer of divine right.

Despite the debate in

Parliament, in the early seventeenth century, there seemed
to be little anxiety "over the legitimization of private

20. Quoted in Ibid., 88.
21. Quoted in Ibid., 88.
22. Ibid., 97.
9

property. 11 23

By the time of the Glorious Revolution,

however, when Locke presented his property theory,
definitions of property changed into a justification of
personal liberties.
As property theory changed during the seventeenth
century from supporting the power of the sovereign into a
justification of personal liberties, historians have come to
regard it as a revelation of what and why Englishmen were
fighting.

In a period of English history which experienced

dramatic changes, moving from the Civil Wars to the
Commonwealth to the Exclusion Crisis to the Glorious
Revolution, property theory "appear(s] to explain so
much. 11 24

During this time period, the preservation of

political liberty was associated with the security of
properties.
In her presentation "'Property' in seventeenth-Century
English Political Thought," Margaret Sampson argues that the
concept of property during the period served as a bridge
between economics and ideology.

She contends that by the

end of the seventeenth century property referred to "rights
in or over things" rather than to the things themselves, but
was increasingly becoming an economic term.25

If property

23. Margaret Sampson, "'Property• in SeventeenthCentury English Political Thought," Proceedings of the
Folger Institute, Volume 3 (The Folger Shakespeare Library,
1990), 263.
24. Ibid., 259.
25. Ibid., 260.
10

refers to "rights in or over things" rather than to the
things themselves, it is a word denoting liberty because it
signifies that people have a right to something.

In

addition, a right in some thing signifies that a person has
an economic interest in that thing because they have a right
to the produce of it.
Property theory as a defense of individual liberties
arose from legal definitions of property given during the
seventeenth century, which reveal a dramatic break from the
earliest legal definition of property.

Legal definitions of

property after Cowell's first started to appear in the 1620s
and became commonplace by the 1650s.

One lawyer, William

Style, published collections of law reports during this
period, using recent legal decisions in his definition.

In

Style's A Practical Register (1670), the work of a judge
from 1648 is referenced in deciding that
the king is thought of simply as another potential
owner, competing for title with other individual
owners, one who indeed has a right to make a way for
his subjects to go across someone else's land but has
no more title in that land as a whole than anyone
else.26
Style's decision reveals a dramatic break from the
definition of property given by Cowell.

Cowell argued that

the king was the only person entitled to property rights;
sixty years later, Style argues that the king is not
entitled to more property rights than any other "potential

26. Quoted in Aylmer, 94.
11

owner."

The difference between Cowell's definition of

property and Style's decision regarding the king's status as
a property owner is similar to the much larger shift taking
place in legal decisions during the seventeenth century.
The break between Cowell and Style represents the much
larger ideological split between common law and feudal law.
While common law supported the endowment of individuals with
a "Romanized form of private property or dominion," feudal
law recognized ownership of goods but not in "the concept of
a right in land good against the world."27

The distinction

of property rights found in feudal and common law reveals a
paradox of English legal tradition because common law
emerged from feudal origins.

While feudal law stressed the

importance of the crown, common law was becoming more and
more important as the seventeenth century progressed because
it could be used as a justification of personal liberties.
The confusion between common law and feudal law was
highlighted by English political changes during the
seventeenth century.

Strikingly, the Interregnum saw the

wide acceptance of the extinction of sociability in a state
of nature and natural property by the Fall, leaving
Hobbesian man.28

In contrast, by the 1680s, natural right

to private property replaced the civil right of private
property present during the Interregnum.

27. Sampson, 263.
28. Ibid. I 272.
12

This replacement

occurred as a fulfillment of the need for "a revolutionary
political theory which could oust a papist successor or king
without upsetting the existing laws and rights of
property."29

In essence, the change in property theory

during the 1680s towards a justification of personal
liberties was a result of the Exclusion Crisis.

Drawn from

contemporary language and moral principles based on natural
law, it was hard to ignore property theories which justified
individual liberties because the theories were based on a
foundation which had wide credibility.JO

Nevertheless, as

Aylmer points out, "the word was not given legal definition
until remarkably late."31

By the time of the exclusion

crisis, natural law theorists were able to draw upon
accepted principles of natural and common law to justify
their property theory.

By the end of the seventeenth

century, the confusion between common and feudal law was
overshadowed by the popular acceptance of common law.
The Whigs used the language of a defense of property
rights extensively during the exclusion crisis.

Including

this language in the rhetoric of the time, the Whigs helped
to increase its use during the late 1670s and early 1680s as
a reason for defense against arbitrary government.

The

party used a rhetoric involving property rights because they

29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Aylmer, 87.
13

perceived the Popish Plot as a threat to the landed class
under a popish successor, who would necessarily be
absolute.32

The Whigs did not just represent the

propertied, however.

By including an argument that property

was more than just the possession of goods, Whigs appealed
to all social groups.

For example, nonconformists adopted

the Whig party because of the religious persecution of the
Restoration.33

Just the presence of an absolute monarch,

Catholic or not, would pose a threat to individual political
liberties.

By defending property rights, the Whigs felt

they were presenting an argument which should be accepted
against a Catholic successor.
In opposition, while the Tories also felt they were
"true defenders of English liberties guaranteed by law,"
they felt the Whigs were the real threat to property
rights.34

Assuming they were defending men of property

against the threat of the masses, the Tories argued their
opposition was "laying a snare for people of liberty and
property. 11 35

The Tories feared the actions and the language

of the Whigs because they felt that party would eliminate
the true English government in a arbitrary, unconstitutional
way.
In order to express their political stance to the

32.
33.
34.
35.

Harris, "'Lives, Liberties, and Estatates,'" 221.
Ibid. I 223.
Ibid. I 219.
Ibid. I 231.
14

public, the Tory party published Sir Robert Filmer's
Patriarcha in 1680.36

Filmer, "an uncompromising

absolutist," most fully expressed his ideas in Patriarcha,
easily his most famous work.37 Resembling the ideas of the
higher clergy before the Civil War, he argued that God gave
the king an absolute power over the state, which can be
viewed as the king's family.

By claiming the king has an

absolute power over the state, just as a father has
an absolute power over his family, Filmer presented the
patriarchal view of society within Patriarcha.

In fact,

"Filmerism was above all things the exaltation of the
family:

it made the rules of domestic society into

36. Notice, however, that most sources just accept that
Filmer was published as a representative spokesman for the
Tory party by members of that party. See, for example,
Gordon J. Schochet's Patriarchalism and Political Thought
(New York, New York: Basic Books, 1975), where Schochet
writes "in 1679, a number of people recognized that the
issue behind the debates in the Exclusion crisis were
similar to the conflicts of the 1640s, and a great many
tracts and pamphlets from the earlier crisis were reprinted
• . . In 1680 Patriarcha was finally published" (119). A
specific mention of publishers can be found in James Daly's
Sir Robert Filmer and English Political Thought (Toronto,
Canada: Toronto University Press, 1979), where Daly tells
us that the Patriarcha published in 1680 was brought out by
Richard Chiswell, although his "identification with royalism
was not so strong; he leaned heavily towards theological
publication" (145). In 1684, Daly relates, Patriarcha was
published again by Richard Royston, who was a royalist
"'publisher to three kings' and had been denounced in 1645
as a 'constant factor for all scandalous books and papers
against the proceedings of parliament'" (145).
37. Johann P. Sommerville, "Introduction," Patriarcha
and Other Writings (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), xi, xiv.

15

principles of political science."38

By arguing that the

king was the absolute father over his country, Filmer
attempted to show that power did not reside in the people
and the government did not arise from their consent.

To

present a contrary argument, Filmer believed, was to present
an argument as "absurd as any ever uttered."39

Filmer used

patriarchal theory to present his belief that without strong
fatherly and royal power, manifest in the king, man's love
of liberty would lead to anarchy.40

Any inroads to

monarchial power he feared would lead to mob rule, as did
the Tories at the time of the exclusion crisis.
Patriarchal theory had become popular in early
seventeenth century England where works like James VI and
I's True Law of Free Monarchies used it against claims which
said that power came from the subject.41

Filmer's work, a

major part of the patriarchal tradition and created by the
most famous and popular of the patriarchal theorists, could
be used by the Tory party to counter the arguments of the
Whigs, who did believe that the king was subject to common
law.42

In writing Patriarcha, Filmer intended to dispel the

38. Peter Laslett, "Sir Robert Filmer: The Man Versus
the Whig Myth," The William and Mary Quarterly 5, 3 (1948),
544.
39. George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory,
(New York, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1949), 513.
40. Sommerville, xxii.
41. Ibid., xviii.
42. However, it must be noted that Filmer became the
most famous patriarchalist after his death, when Patriarcha
was published.
16

"common opinion" that
'Mankind is naturally endowed and born with freedom
from all subjection, and at liberty to choose what form
of government it please, and that the power which any
one man hath over others was at the first by human
right bestowed according to the discretion of the
multitude. 1 43
Filmer opposed this opinion because
it is not to be found in the ancient Fathers and
doctors of the primitive church.
It contradicts the
doctrine and history of the Holy Scriptures, the
constant practice of all ancient monarchies and the
very principles of the law of nature.
It is hard to
say whether it be more erroneous in divinity or
dangerous in policy.44
This "common opinion" became the standard Whig position by
the time of the exclusion crisis, thirty years after Filmer
stated it.
There is some scholarly debate as to whether Filmer's
ideas really did represent the standard Tory political
position.

Peter Laslett, for instance, writes

It is well known that in republishing Filmer, the
Tories, champions of the Monarchy against Shaftesbury
and the Whig Exclusionists, scored a notable propaganda
victory.45
He continues by claiming that the exclusion crisis can be
referred to as "the Filmer controversy of 1679-81," because
after Patriarcha was published in January of 1680, there was

43. Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, ed.
Johann P. Sommerville (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 2.
44. Ibid., 2.
45. Laslett, "Introduction," Two Treatises of
Government, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University
Press, 1963), 64.
17

"an enormous growth of Filmer's influence which went on
during the rest of that year. 11 46

Knights, who has spent

some time studying the pamphlet wars of the Exclusion
crisis, agrees with Laslett.

He explains that, while the

publishing of Patriarcha was part of a larger trend of
loyalist reliance on works from between 1640 and 1660, "It
is easy to see how Filmer's Patriarcha was published as
part, or indeed, as the embodiment, of this loyalist attack
in the autumn and winter of 1679-1680. 11 47

A strong case can

be made that Filmer's ideas represented the Tory views at
the time when Patriarcha was published.48
In contrast to Laslett and Knight's ideas of Filmer's
influence rests the opinion of James Daly, who denies that
Filmer's work was representative of the Tory party.

Daly

believes the parliamentary debates over exclusion "show no
evidence of Tory use of Filmerian ideas, and could hardly do
so."49

In fact, "In view of the traditional story, it may

46. Ibid., 67, 72-3.
47. Knights, 249.
48. There is some debate as to the dates of Filmer's
composition of Patriarcha. In "Sir Robert Filmer: The Man
Versus the Whig Myth," Laslett claims that it was written in
the late 1630s and early 1640s. An alternative dating is
provided by Sommerville in his "Introduction" to Patriarcha
and Other Writings.
In his introduction, Sommerville
presents his idea that "Perhaps the first two chapters of
Patriarcha were composed in the 1620s and the third chapter
about 1630" (xxxiv). John M. Wallace, James Daly, and
Richard Tuck have also provided different dates for the
work's composition.
49. James Daly, Sir Robert Filmer and English Political
Thought (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press,
1979), 146.
18

be surprising that Filmer made so little impact on the
exclusiondebates."50

Nevertheless, even Daly admits that

Filmer must have some basis as a Tory spokesman because
Patriarcha appeared twice during the exclusion
parliaments.51
Whether Filmer represented the standard Tory position
or not, it is certain that he became famous because he was
refuted in detail by John Locke, Algernon Sidney, and James
Tyrrell.

Filmer tried to keep Patriarcha (originally

written in several stages in the late 1630s or early 1640s)
from being published within his lifetime.52

He intended to

circulate the manuscript by having friends pass it to their
friends.53

Because of its method of circulation and

Filmer's pains to keep if from being published, it is not
known why Patriarcha was written, who read it, or what the
audience was supposed to think, although it must have
labeled Filmer as an "extreme conservative."54

Filmer was

considered so conservative that he suffered because of his
royalist beliefs during the Interregnum; he spent over
eighteen months in prison, lost over 1500 pounds of personal
wealth, experienced damage to his home, and felt exactions
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., 145-146. Daly contends that most purchasers
of Patriarcha were Whigs, rather than Tories. This
contention only makes sense because the Whigs had to argue
against the Tory stance, Tories did not have to defend
themselves within their own party.
52. Laslett, "Sir Robert Filmer," 524.
53. Ibid. I 532.
54. Ibid.
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of military and fiscal authorities during the Civil Wars.SS
Filmer died on May 30, 1653, nearly thirty years before
Patriarcha was published.
When Filmer's work was published during the exclusion
crisis his ideas were not "associated with an unpopular and
even persecuted minority."S6

Because his work did not

represent the minority during the exclusion crisis, and
because, according to Laslett•s astonishing claim, Filmer
may be the "only one even reasonably effective theoretical
conservative in the political history of the English
speaking peoples," his work was open for attack to provide a
foundation for the opposition.S7

By writing in refutation

of Filmer, while representing the Whigs, Locke, Sidney, and
Tyrrell helped establish a foundation for their party's
political argument and their own reputations as political
theorists.
Of these three men, Sidney was the only republican.

In

his major work, Discourses Concerning Government, he reveals
both his republican interests and his step-by-step
refutation of Filmer.SS

As a republican member of

parliament, Sidney fought for the "good

SS. Ibid., S40.
S6. Ibid., S23.
S7. Ibid.
sa. For a more detailed discussion of Sidney during
this period, see Jonathon Scott's Algernon Sidney and the
Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683 {Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Cambridge University Press, 1991). Although this work has
been criticized for overemphasizing a republican interest
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old cause," believing that religion was not important to
political man's motivation but only "a pretext for the
recovery of their liberty and ancient privileges."59

For

Sidney, religion was his own and should be removed from the
realm of politics, although he perceived Patriarcha as a
threat because it argued for a popish successor.60

In the

sense that he did not believe religion to be important in
the realm of politics, Sidney was not a typical Whig.
Unlike other Whigs, he did not see religion as the central
issue of the exclusion crisis.

He differed enough from

other Whigs that he opposed Shaftesbury and cannot really be
classified as either exclusionist or anti-exclusionist.61
As a republican, Sidney was not a mainstream Whig.62
While an established republican and member of
Parliament, Sidney's political writing was not influential

among the Whig party, and an "exclusion of exclusion," it
has been praised for Scott's contribution to historiography
because it reveals Sidney acted independently of Shaftesbury
and was an "old-cause" man rather than a Whig. Scott
devotes two chapters of the book to discussing the arguments
present in Sidney's Discourses Concerning Government and
focuses on issues of popery and arbitrary government.
59. Knights, 137, 142.
60. Blair Worden, "The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon
Sidney," Journal of British Studies 24, 1 (1985), 22. Also
see J.G.A. Pocock, "England's Cato: The Virtues and
Fortunes of Algernon Sidney," Historical Journal 37, 4
(1994) I 926.
61. Harris, Politics Under the Later Stuarts, 284.
Knights, 217.
62. See Worden, 27-28, who claims Sidney was not
championed until after his death and then by radical Whigs
who downplayed his republicanism.
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enough before the eighteenth century to be considered for
its statements about the exclusion crisis.

Because Sidney's

thesis rests on a "one-sided bargain that leaves kings
permanently subject to the will of the sovereign people," at
a time when the monarchy would not be eliminated, his
contemporaries could not accept his writings.63
Indeed, his main claim to fame is not his work but his trial
and execution for an alleged role in the Rye House Plot of
1683: an alleged attempt to assassinate Charles II as he
passed the Rye House from his castle to London.64

His death

turned him into a martyr for the Whig cause, which was
perpetuated by the posthumous publication of Discourses
Concerning Government in 1698.

Although he offers something

as a republican, Sidney is otherwise ineffectual as a
political theorist.65
Sidney's Discourses, "a rather rambling and ill
constructed book," has been criticized because it does not
add "any significant addition to political ideas generally
familiar in the seventeenth century. 11 66

Even republicanism,

the issue closest to Sidney's heart, could not establish him
as a vital political theorist among his contemporaries
because his idealization of an aristocratic republic was
never practical.

63.
64.
65.
66.

As a republican, Sidney was less original

Pocock, 925. Worden, 16.
See Worden for Sidney's role in the Rye House Plot.
Pocock, 915.
Sabine, 508.
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and less important than James Harrington and, by the end of
the Glorious Revolution, became part of a tradition which
was eliminated as a serious political system outside of the
United States.

Republicanism was dead at the end of the

Glorious Revolution because "no one worth mentioning wished
to try the sad experiment of the Commonwealth."67

As an

author and as a republican, Sidney was not an effective
political theorizer for the issues of liberty at the time of
the exclusion crisis.
Partly because of the strength of his myth as a martyr
for the Whig cause, and as a political theorist of rebellion
in late seventeenth century England, Sidney is worth
studying because he reveals the relationship between
politics and ideas at his time.68

In fact, it has been said

that Sidney's importance was as a "political actor. 11 69
Like Sidney's Discourses Concerning Government, John
Locke's Two Treatises of Government was written in
refutation of Filmer's Patriarcha.

Unlike Sidney, however,

the alternative political theory which Locke provides is
effective as a representation of the Whig position and as a
useful replacement for Filmer's patriarchal theory.

Writing

as a spokesman for the Earl of Shaftesbury, Locke's Two
Treatises expose him as a def ender of revolution and a

67. Ibid., 517.
68. This is an argument that Worden develops in further
detail.
69. Pocock, 916.
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contributor to the Whig-Tory battle of the exclusion
crisis.70
Until the twentieth century, it was assumed that Locke
wrote the Two Treatises to justify the Glorious Revolution.
After all, the book was not published until 1690, and Locke
writes in his preface that he hopes his work is
sufficient to establish the Throne of our Great
Restorer, Our present King William; to make good his
Title, in the Consent of the People • • . And to
justifie to ,the World, the People of England, whose
love of their Just and Natural Rights, with their
Resolution to preserve them, saved the Nation when it
was on the very brink of Slavery and Ruine.71
Despite Locke's statement, Laslett argued in his
introduction to an edition of the work that the "Two
Treatises is an Exclusion Tract, not a Revolution
pamphlet."72

Through his research, Laslett determined that

Locke drafted most of the Two Treatises in the autumn and
winter of 1679-1680.
Despite what has been called "unrefuted bibliographical
arguments" made by Laslett, at least one other dating has
been provided for Locke's drafting of the Two Treatises.73
Richard Ashcraft argues that Locke composed the work after

70. For a more detailed explanation of Locke's
relationship with Shaftesbury, see Richard Ashcraft's
Revolutionary Politics and Locke's "Two Treatises of
Government" (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1986).
71. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, revised
edition, ed. and intr. Peter Laslett, (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1963), preface.
72. Laslett, "Introduction," 75.
73. Knights, 255.
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the dissolution of the Oxford Parliament in 1681, as a
justification for a planned revolution.74

Although

Ashcraft's dating has been criticized as being reached too
hastily, it is important because it casts Locke in a
revolutionary role, as spokesman for the Earl of
Shaftesbury.75

Rather than lending credence to the Two

Treatises as an abstract book of political philosophy,
Ashcraft's dating shows that Locke's work cannot be removed
from the political circumstances (the Exclusion crisis and
the falling of Whigs in Parliament) in which it was written.
No matter what date is accepted for when Locke wrote
the Two Treatises (and there seems to be no way to say which
of the earlier two datings is correct) it was written in
partial refutation of Filmer around the time of the
exclusion crisis.

Varied statements have been given to

explain why Locke wrote against Filmer.

For example, Sabine

claims that Locke's political theory was "superficially
simple" and took advantage of "poor Filmer, who had the
merit of being absurd and of appearing more absurd than he
was"; whereas Laslett credits Filmer as
the man of the moment, a formidable and growing force
with those whose political positions mattered, and
representing in himself the ipissima verba of the
established order. It was because this was so that
Locke found himself impelled to write on this subject,
and for that reason Filmer's thinking lies directly
behind his political doctrines.76
74. See Ashcraft's Revolutionary Politics, especially
Chapter 7.
75. Knights, 255.
76. Sabine, 524. Laslett, "Introduction," 50.
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Accepting Daly's moderate argument that there is no smoke
without fire, so that Filmer must have represented the Tory
position to a degree, Locke wrote in refutation of Filmer
because he was accessible and presented political ideas in
disagreement with his own ideas.

Probably written during

the pamphlet wars of 1679-1680, Locke's thesis "answered
almost every point raised by loyalist pamphleteers,"
including "the ideas of the equality of man, the formation
of government by popular consent."77

Because he wrote

against Filmer, Locke can be seen as a champion of the Whig
cause.
The First Treatise or, "In the Former, The False
Principles and Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer, And His
Followers, Are Discredited and Overthrown" was devoted to
countering Filmer's argument, as presented in Patriarcha,
nearly step-by-step.

Locke begins the First Treatise by

explaining that he is writing against Filmer because his
book is
a Book, which was to provide Chains for all Mankind, I
should find nothing but a Rope of Sand, useful perhaps
to such, whose Skill and Business it is to raise a
Dust, and would blind the People, the better to mislead
them, but in truth not of any force to draw those into
Bondage.78
Although attacked as having "no permanent importance," the
First Treatise serves as a direct connection between Locke

77. Knights, 251.
78. Locke, First Treatise, 1. The number in all
references to Locke will indicate the paragraph number.
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and his political philosophy with the time of the exclusion
crisis.79

While he does not mention parliamentary issues of

exclusion in his Second Treatise, which Knights claims he
uses to expand his attack to include writers other than
Filmer, the major issue of the treatise--man's creation of
government for the protection of private property--can be
credited to Filmer.SO

If Locke had not refuted Filmer in

the First Treatise, his attention may not have been directed
towards property issues.

It has even been said that Locke

held "no sign of interest in the theory of property"
before writing against his nemesis.81
Nevertheless, Locke became an innovator in property
theory.

Many of the major interpretations of his work

devote themselves exclusively to his property theory,
including those interpretations by

c.

B. Macpherson and

James Tully, and no major work on Locke neglects this aspect
of his thought.82

Although the Second Treatise, and the

more abstract political philosophy it contains, has
overshadowed the First Treatise, Locke's writing became
"intellectually and historically important" because it

80. Knights, 251. Note, however, in the last chapter
of the Second Treatise, Locke seems to be most concerned
with the right of summoning and dissolving Parliament. In
his "Introduction" to the Two Treatises, Laslett claims that
this right was an issue between 1678 (or 1675) and 1681
( 68) •
81. Laslett, "Introduction," 81.
82. See my appendix (below) for a discussion of
different interpretations of Locke's property theory, which
will be helpful in reading my second and third chapters.
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started as "a deliberate and polemically effective
refutation of the writings of Sir Robert Filmer."83
Like his friend Locke, James Tyrrell also wrote a
political tract at the time of the exclusion crisis in
refutation of Filmer.

His book, Patriarcha non Monarcha

(1681), was much more of a dialectic between his own
arguments and those of Filmer than the Two Treatises.
Tyrrell felt impelled to refute the divine right of kings
and Filmer, whom he saw as dangerous because he upheld royal
absolutism by hereditary right and did not believe in the
antiquity of the House of Commons.

As soon as Tyrrell read

Filmer's Patriarcha, he felt it was a book which he should
devote his energies against.

As he revealed to his

antiquarian lawyer friend, William Petyt,
There is lately come the this town a new treatise of
Sir Robert Filmer's called Patriarcha, which I am
considering of . . . for the 3rd chapter contains
dangerous errors.84
In the preface to Patriarcha non Monarcha, Tyrrell would
elaborate on why he took the pains to write the book:
I write these Observations for no other end than for
the Truth, and in defence of the Government as it is
establisht, and the just Rights and Liberties of all
true English-men. All which, I pray God preserve as
long as the Sun and Moon endure.85

83. Laslett, 89.
84. Quoted in J.W. Gough, "James Tyrrell, Whig
Historian and Friend of John Locke," Historical Journal 19,
3 (1976): 584.
85. James Tyrrell, Patriarcha non Monarcha. The
patriarch unmonarch'd: beinq observations on a late
treatise and divers other miscellanies, published under the
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He stated his purpose after declaring that Filmer, among
others, was "a wooden Idol of their own making."86

When

Tyrrell states "of their making" he is referring to the
Tories; he recognizes Filmer as the spokesman for the
opposition and works to discredit his position.
As his writing reveals, Tyrrell was a member of the
Whig party and openly became one after the Glorious
Revolution.

Although his father, Sir Timothy Tyrrell, had

been a knight in royal service, James devoted himself to
"attacking the principles for which the royalists had
stood," though he does provide a defense for the established
monarchy.87
1~70,

After marrying into an estate at Oakley in

and refusing to practice law, he served as a Justice

of the Peace and deputy lieutenant for his county of
Buckinghamshire.88

Tyrrell remained a loyal Whig until his

death in 1718, when one person remarked that
"He was a good scholar and well versed in his history,
but tied to a Party, and writ to serve a turn .
He
had not great judgement, but was to be esteemed for the
great pains he took."89
Although this commentator criticized Tyrrell for his

name of Sir Robert Filmer, baronet.
In which the falseness
of those opinions that would make monarchy jure divino are
laid open: and the true principles of government and
property (especially in our kingdom) asserted.
By a lover
of truth and his country (London, England: Printed for
Richard Janeway, 1681), preface.
86. Ibid.
87. Gough, 581.
88. Ibid., 581-582.
89. Quoted in Ibid., 605.
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attachment to the Whig party, this attachment was a bond
that connects Patriarcha non Monarcha to the political
circumstances of the exclusion crisis.

Writing to "serve a

turn," Tyrrell's interests in writing his book lay in
rejecting the Tory position, fronted by Filmer, in order to
advance the position of the Whigs.

He even said as much

about the two parties when he remarked about groups in
Britain in 1713, claiming that non-jurors and Whigs were the
only honest men in the kingdom, while Torys and High-Church
men "are men of no principles, but go backwards and forwards
without any regard to conscience."90

Tyrrell championed the

Whig cause, disliking what he knew of the Tory political
philosophy.
Unfortunately for historians of late seventeenth
century England, little attention has been paid to the
thought of Tyrrell.

There is only one secondary source

devoted to Tyrrell.

Many works about Locke's political

philosophy refer to his friend.

Even J.W. Gough's "James

Tyrrell, Whig Historian and Friend of John Locke," bears in
its title a reminder that Tyrrell is famous for his
relationship with Locke.

Gough does write that

It has been said of James Tyrrell that his "main claim
to distinction was perhaps his friendship with John
Locke," but his elaborate monument at Oakley Church
. • . although it records a number of his qualities and
achievements, does not mention this.91

90. Quoted in Ibid., 609.
91. Gough, 581.
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Tyrrell, as Gough's statement hints, is worthy of study on
his own merits.

Tyrrell did write another work against the

Filmerian position in defense of the Whigs in 1694,
Bibliotecha Politica, which is considerably longer than
Patriarcha non Monarcha, and has had some recent historical
attention devoted to it.
In his "Introduction" to the Two Treatises, Laslett
recognizes that Tyrrell was more convincing to his
contemporaries in some ways and, unlike Locke, realized
"Filmer's needling effectiveness."92

Laslett does not

expand on these points, though, and does not give an
indication of where these points can be researched.

Despite

a lack of secondary sources, both Locke and Tyrrell were
important because of their refutation of Filmer's
Patriarcha, their reliance on natural law arguments, and
their inclusion of property in their political philosophy,
as well as their demonstrated relationship to the Whig-Tory
debate centering around the exclusion crisis.

In the final

analysis, however, Tyrrell's Patriarcha non Monarcha is the
most important piece to consider in context of the times in
which it was written.

Tyrrell's work, more than Locke's Two

Treatises, reflects the political circumstances of the
exclusion crisis.
To show the importance of Tyrrell's work it must be

92. Laslett, "Introduction," 92-3.
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compared and contrasted with Locke's political philosophy.
Both men took pains to refute Filmer's patriarchal position
and, in doing so, adopted property theory which reveals the
Whig movement from historical arguments to natural law
arguments.

Based on natural law restrictions, both Locke

and Tyrrell incorporate property theory into their work.
Relating man's acquisition of private property from common
property given by God, they both accept the labor theory of
value and its restrictions.

Despite their acceptance of the

labor theory of value, the definitions of property which
Locke and Tyrrell accept are drastically different.

On the

one hand, Locke defines property in a way that he attempts
to for his definition to bridge economic and ideological
rights.

Tyrrell, on the other hand, presents a property

definition where the term is only employed in reference to
economic rights and occupancy is accepted as a right to
property.

In addition, while Locke will not accept any

absolute monarchy as legitimate, Tyrrell presents an
argument in which absolute monarchy can be considered
legitimate in some circumstances.

Claiming occupancy as a

right to property, which Locke does not, Tyrrell's possible
acceptance of absolute monarchy and his purely economic
definition of property reveals him as a supporter of the
status quo under the political circumstances in which he was
writing.
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Chapter One
The Refutation of Filmer: A Turn From Historical
Arguments to Natural Law Theories
In writing Patriarcha, Filmer was presenting the
patriarchal justification of political authority.

The work

was important enough that Locke, Sidney, and Tyrrell
attacked it, and so, as Gordon Schochet claims, "it is
necessary to examine patriarchalism on its merits as a
meaningful justification of political obligation."!

In

seventeenth-century Stuart England, patriarchal theory was
accepted and pervasive because its appeal to history and the
Bible was accepted.2

1. Gordon J. Schochet, Patriarchalism in Political
Thought: The Authoritarian Family and Political Speculation
and Attitudes Esoeciallv in Seventeenth-Century England (New
York: New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1975), 4.
2. For a revisionist approach, see James Daly's Sir
Robert Filmer and English Political Thought, where the
author claims that designating Filmer as a patriarchalist
can be deceptive because it does not distinguish his
theories, where the political sovereign is dominant and not
the family, from anyone else's theories (151-152).
In
addition, patriarchalism "does not really express the
central characteristic of Filmerism" (151).
Daly also
argues that, despite the merits that patriarchalism was a
defense of the Stuarts, Filmer himself was nothing but the
perfect "straw man" for the Whigs (160). He avowed
principles which the Stuarts feared, but his ideas did not
move Whig enemies, rather being "an isolated group of
ideas," which presented his attackers with "all the glory of
combatting Goliath with none of the dangers David had faced"
(161, 163). This being said, Daly must be praised for his
critical and interesting work. Unfortunately, the book
reads as if Daly set out to argue with any and every
standard work on the subject. This reading both limits the
forcefulness of his argument and constantly tells the reader
to beware that the author may have written to create a
reputation for himself. An example of an attempt to
establish a reputation is given when Daly claims that Filmer
became "something of an intellectual revolutionary" because
33

It seems that there was "no patriarchal theory of
obligation prior to 1603. 11 3

Appealing to both men who

lacked education and the gentry, both groups which could
accept a theory which supported their dominance within their
own families and followed the great chain of being notion,
when an absolutist doctrine appeared in Scotland and England
under James I, patriarchalism could take hold.4

Patriarchal

political theory
found a living social reinforcement in the very strong
position contemporary society afforded to a father
• • . While patriarchalism was by no means universally
used or used in the same way when it was, it was able
to provide material for a wide range of use before
Filmer published anything on political theory.5
For patriarchalists of this period, government was not a
human construct but part of the natural and god-given order.
According to David Foster, who studies Locke's relationship
with patriarchal theory, patriarchalists believed government
did not just preserve property but served to provide a
"comprehensive paternal care of citizens."6

James

t even

used fatherly analogies to describe his kingly powers.7

he ignored antiquity and Christian wisdom (154). Although
Filmer was an important intellectual, even a cursory reading
of Patriarcha reveals that he relied on both Aristotle and
the bible for his arguments, in direct conflict with Daly's
claim.
3. Schochet, 16.
4. Ibid., 85-87.
5. Daly, 59.
6. David Foster, "Taming the Father: John Locke's
Critique of Patriarchal Fatherhood," Review of Politics 56,
4 ( 1994) : 644.
7. Schochet, 87.
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During his reign, tracts were published which stressed the
importance of the Fifth Commandment as a basis for fatherly
authority and court rulings were given based on the Fifth
Commandment.a

Seventeenth-century England experienced a

growing acceptance of patriarchal theory as the explanation
for government's origin.
When the theory reached Filmer, he came to believe that
patriarchalism provided the natural basis of order in the
family and in government, arguing that kingly power and
fatherly power are one and the same thing.
this belief in his writing:

He expresses

"If we compare the natural

duties of a father with those of a king, we find them to be
all one, without any difference at all but only in the
latitude or extent of them. 11 9 Furthermore, Filmer contends,
"all the duties of a king are summed up in an universal
fatherly care of his people. 11 10

According to Filmer, the

king was the father of his subjects; as the father, his
subjects should be willing to follow his commands and accept
his government.
Patriarcha established Filmer as a critic of populism,
which he felt went against the tying of men to institutions.
He felt men should be tied to institutions, for tying men to
institutions was the same thing as admitting "the superior

8. Ibid., 89-91.
9. Filmer, 12.
10. Ibid.
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powers and rights of fathers" who had established these
institutions.11

Thus, populism could not be reconciled with

deriving obligations from the ancestral contracts which
originally established these institutions.

After all, it is

"unnatural for men to have to choose their governors, or to
govern or to partake in the government. 11 12

When

patriarchalism became a political doctrine of serious debate
during the exclusion crisis, it became so because it was the
main opposition to populist writers.13

If it were not for

the Whig-Tory battle during the 1680s, Filmer--as an
opponent of populism--may never have become well known.14
Anti-populist, Filmer was against the state of nature,
contractual government, and the source and character of
private property away from the king.

Because the historical

accuracy of the Bible was widely accepted in the seventeenth
century, Filmer was able to employ biblical history from
Adam to demonstrate a direct line from Adam to monarchs.
This line of succession allowed for private property, which
had originally been given from God exclusively to Adam, to
now be under the sole guidance of the king.

Much of

12. Filmer, 32.
13. Schochet, 120.
14. Again, see Daly for a revisionist account. He
claims that Filmer's now accepted position as a
representative royalist is a designation his contemporaries
denied him (159). Rather than English royalism, Daly
argues, Filmer's ideas were of legal reductionism, but the
Whig triumph inflated his reputation at a cost of distorting
his ideas as a royalist.
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Filmer's originality as a patriarchalist arises from his
Genesis argument.

He makes Genesis "the only source for

genetic, patriarchal, and any other principles of political
obligation."15

All of Filmer's theory arises from what he

thought was God's grant to Adam of absolute power, which has
descended to contemporary monarchs.

He thinks that

This lordship which Adam by creation had over the whole
world, and by right descending from him the patriarchs
did enjoy, was as large and ample as the absolutest
domain of any monarch which hath been since the
creation.16
His reliance on the Genesis argument has been praised as
making "sovereignty so all-inclusive, so radically simple,
that problems of definition could hardly appear."17
Filmer did not accept the contractual theory of
government.

In direct conflict with contractual thinkers,

Filmer's
chief point was the moral and logical impossibility of
deriving government, private property, and the
hierarchial arrangements that exist in society from the
conditions of original natural freedom and equality.18
According to Filmer, if there had truly been natural freedom
in a state of nature, people would not have progressed
towards instituting government, but towards anarchy.

After

all, if all men are equal, a contract constructed by one
generation could not be used to govern the next.

15.
16.
17.
18.

Daly, 61.
Filmer, 4.
Daly, 61.
Schochet, 122.
37

Filmer's

patriarchal theory
opened the prospect of a free-for-all where he himself
was looking for a practical explanation for the orderly
construction of new sovereignties consistent with his
own theories.19
For order, people needed the obligation to their sovereign,
the same obligation they owed their father.

After all,

Filmer contends,
this subjection of children is the only fountain of all
regal authority, by the ordination of God himself.
It
follows that civil power not only in general is by
divine institution . . • but power respective in regard
of the special form of government.20
In other words, because the people owe their sovereign the
same obedience they owe their father, as God ordains, order
can be maintained.
As a result of his rejection of the idea of contractual
government, Filmer also denied the possibility that private
property, outside of the monarch's guidance, exists.

Any

property that exists outside of the monarch only does so
because of the king's graces.
.

The king holds a "lordship

. • over the world" which had descended from Adam and was

a "large and ample" absolute domain.21

The king could,

however, grant subjects rights to his property.

Otherwise,

for private property to exist, Filmer reasoned, everyone
must have come together at some point to agree to its
institution and he cannot find any instances of people doing

19. Daly, 86.
20. Filmer, 7.
21. Ibid., 4.
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this.

In Patriarcha, he asks his readers for "but one

example out of the history of the whole world" where
everyone had come together to make a decision.22

Even if

everyone had decided to a contract for private property,
Filmer thought, the contract would not be binding from one
generation to the next because natural law theorists would
not accept patriarchalism.
Instead of contracts instituting government and private
property, Filmer believed that every government had a
sovereign whose power was arbitrary and above the power of
positive law.

The sovereign was above positive law because

kings must stand as judges over laws, which are by nature
confusing.23

The sovereign's authority was arbitrary

because making law according to law is both circular and
originally impossible.24

Arguing against individual

equality in a state of nature, contractual government, and
the source and character of private property, Filmer was
trenchantly anti-populist.
Filmer's patriarchal theory had an anti-populist nature
because Filmer used it to link the divine right of kings to
patriarchal authority and the "direct derivation of all
political authority from the power of Adam."25

He is the

only patriarchalist that denies a father's authority changes

22.
23.
24.
25.

Ibid., 6.
Ibid., 47.
Schochet, 132.
Ibid., 139.
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as his child matures.26

Rather than reason, the final test

of truth for Filmer was the Bible, which he felt justifies
only patriarchal monarchy.

As he writes in Patriarcha, "God

• • • [has) taught us by natural instinct, signified to us
by the creation and confirmed by His own example, the
excellency of monarchy," for "There is not in all Scripture
mention and approbation of any other form of government."27
This was a solid, if not original, justification.

Whether

or not his theory was the standard Tory position at the time
of the Exclusion crisis, it was the most popular patriarchal
position and justified anti-populist political beliefs.28
One of the reasons for the success of Filmer's theory
is that it gives order to the world which God created. As a
part of this order, monarchial and fatherly power are
identical and not merely similar.

By equating fatherly and

monarchial power, Filmer concluded that political power is
natural, divine, absolute, and unlimited, just as familial
authority is in its pristine form.29

Filmer tells his

readers that
as kingly power is by the law of God, so it hath no
inferior law to limit it. The father of a family
governs by no other law than by his own will, not by
the laws or wills of his sons or servants.30
As this passage illustrates, the sovereign stands supreme

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Foster, 648.
Filmer, 12.
Schochet, 139.
Ibid., 269.
Filmer, 35.
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within society because, just like a father has no authority
above him in the family, the king has no power over him in
the government.
Contemporary monarchy could be justified by the
derivation of its power from Adam.

This derivation, which

could secure the fundamentally political interpretation
of fatherhood and provide a basis on which that
interpretation could become an explanation for the
derivation of states,
leads to an implicit assumption of primogeniture.31

As

shown through his linking of both the power of fathers and
kings to primogeniture, Filmer depicts fatherhood as holding
an abstract and political nature.

However, while fatherhood

is political, he does not discuss the English succession in
Patriarcha because it was not an issue during his lifetime,
which became a major political issue of the exclusion
crisis.
In ordering the world according to patriarchalism,
Filmer placed a tremendous importance on property.

During

early and mid-seventeenth century England, Filmer believed
that property was the main principle of government and
justice; at the time no one else believed the same thing.32
By the time of the exclusion crisis, Filmer's belief gained
wide acceptance, but until then his contemporaries thought
property indicated belongingness and might apply to

31. Daly, 74.
32. See Daly, 158.
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political rights.33

Englishmen considered property as their

highest ranking liberty, but Filmer believed that only the
sovereign (as Adam's descendant) could create property
rights.
If only the sovereign could make property rights, then
sovereignty and liberty are incompatible.

Sovereignty and

liberty would be incompatible because the monarch's subjects
would not be at liberty to enjoy property rights which were
not subject to the monarch's power.

Filmer believed that he

could show liberty was a concept which was irrelevant to
political circumstances.

He writes,

these and many more absurdities are easily removed, if
on the contrary we maintain the natural and private
dominion of Adam to be the foundation of all government
and propriety.34
Not only was liberty irrelevant, it was not natural.

As

Filmer explains,
For if the liberty were natural it would give power to
the multitude to assemble themselves when and where
they please, to bestow sovereignty and by factions to
limit and direct the exercise of it.35
People do not have the right to assemble themselves when and
where they want, though, because the organization which
represents them (Parliament) is under the king.

Members of

Parliament "are only members and a part of that body,
whereof the king is the head and ruler. 11 36
33.
(above).
34.
35.
36.

See the discussion of property in the introduction
Filmer, 6.
Ibid. I 55.
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Filmer's reliance on Adam's original and absolute
proprietary rights led him to a rejection of any notion that
men once enjoyed goods in common but had grown to the point
where individuals had acquired private property by natural
law.

Because Adam owned everything, so must every monarch.

Even the individual's own person is owned so long as the
monarch has granted it to that individual; the monarch can
revoke this ownership right at anytime.

In writing

Patriarcha, Filmer reveals the purpose he had in mind when
writing:
My task is chiefly to enquire from whom these
[liberties] first came, not to dispute what of how many
they are, but whether they are derived from the law of
natural liberty or from the grace and bounty of
princes.37
After telling his readers his purpose for writing, Filmer
proceeds to explain,
My desire and hope is that the people of England may
and do enjoy as ample privileges as any nation under
heaven. The greatest liberty in the world (if it be
duly considered) is for people to live under a monarch.
It is the Magna Carta of this kingdom. All other shows
or pretexts of liberty are but several degrees of
slavery, and a liberty only to destroy to them.38
As this passage reveals, to live under a monarch is to live
under the monarch's guidance of a person's political rights.
Unfortunately, because the monarch granted these rights,
they were subject to his will.

Like every other political

right, even property in one's own person was a "thoroughly

37. Ibid., 4.
38. Ibid.
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insecure and retractable emanation of a sovereign will, a
will which by right could acknowledge no limits
whatsoever. 11 39
As well as serving Filmer's argument for absolute
monarchy, property also serves his argument against
government by consent.

Filmer reasoned that private

property, like government, could not have been formed by
consent.

If private property had been formed by consent, it

would mean that at one time every man must have given his
decision that private property should be instituted.

If any

man later decided that he did not want any other man to
enjoy private property, every man must lose the right to
his individual property.

Absolute consent is impossible in

the first place, though.

As Filmer asks,

can they show or prove that ever the whole multitude
met and divided this power, which God gave them in
gross, by breaking it into parcels and by appointing a
distinct power to each several commonwealth?40
Filmer does not believe that anyone can prove what he asks.
As a result, there is "neither reason nor proof for so
thinking" that absolute consent to private property was ever
given.41

Likewise, Filmer believes, no one can prove that

absolute consent was ever given to the institution of
government.

If, at any time, there was at least one man who

wanted government to be eradicated, no man could live in a
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state of political society.
Filmer's opponents were forced to pay serious attention
to the relationship between a state's origin and property
because he used a theory of property, originating from
Adam's absolute ownership of goods, which demonstrated that
monarchs had absolute property rights over all of their
subjects.

Although Filmer could explain his patriarchal

political theory in Patriarcha, it was sufficiently weak on
a number of points to allow for a successful attack by Locke
and Tyrrell.

"Far more successful in the critical task than

in setting forth his own theory of politics," Filmer's
attack against state of nature political theories "was
unanswerable while simultaneously proclaiming the uniqueness
and absurdity of his patriarchal doctrine."42

Filmer was

easily attacked for his own theory through his Genesis
argument, which is described as "intellectually suicidal."43
Neither Tyrrell nor Locke agreed with Filmer's
interpretation of Genesis so that a step-by-step refutation
of his theory fell into place; if one did not agree with
Filmer's interpretation of Genesis, the foundation of his
theory collapses.

In addition to his Genesis argument,

Filmer had a weak point in his reading of the Fifth
Commandment.

According to Filmer, this commandment should

not include "thy mother," while it should strengthen the
41. Ibid.
42. Schochet, 115.
43. Daly, 156.
45

meaning of "honour" to "obey the sovereign in all things."44
Filmer states his belief in the importance of the Fifth
Commandment in Patriarcha:
To confirm this natural right of regal power, we find
in the decalogue that the law which enjoins obedience
to kings is delivered in the terms of 'honour thy
father' [Exodus, xx, 12] as if all power were
originally in the father.45
According to Filmer's patriarchal theory, there is a logical
connection that extends the Fifth Commandment to reflect the
power of a king over his subject.

Most importantly,

Filmer's attackers, including Locke and Tyrrell, could agree
that the state had patriarchal origins, but did not have to
agree these origins led to inevitable and necessary absolute
monarchy.
Locke and Tyrrell both deny Filmer's thesis that Adam
was originally granted absolute monarchial power by God.
Instead, they argue, God originally gave the world to
society in common.

For example, Locke writes, in direct

reference to Filmer, that although Filmer claims "as soon as
Adam was Created he was de facto Monarch, because by Right
of Nature it was due to Adam, to be Governor of his
Posterity," in actuality,
he could not de facto be by Providence Constituted the
Governor of the World at a time when there was actually
no Government, no Subjects to be governed, which our
A-- here confesses.46

44. Ibid. I 63.
45. Filmer, 11-12.
46. Locke, First Treatise, 16.
46

Locke then proceeds to claim, using "3 Gen. 16," that, even
if Adam was granted monarchial power, as Filmer claims, it
could not have been until after the introduction of Eve and
the Fall.47

By this time, however, Adam was so far removed

"in condition from his Creation" that it is impossible to
say "by God's Appointment. as soon as Adam was created he
was Monarch of the World."48

Locke reason that by Filmer's

logic, in relation to Adam, that Filmer could be
an Author before he writ his Book, not in Act •tis
true, but in Habit, for when he had once Publish'd it,
it was due to him by the Right of Nature, to be an
Author.49
Instead, Locke will argue that the state of nature in
Genesis is peaceful to deduce that God gave the world to
society in common.50
Locke questions how Filmer can use his interpretation
of Genesis to claim that people owe political obedience to
their sovereign, because there is no clear indication to
whom obedience is owed.

He refutes an argument for

primogeniture, implicit in Filmer's theory, explaining,

47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., 18.
50. In the Fifth Chapter of his Second Treatise, "Of
Property," Locke explains that he "shall endeavour to shew,
how Men might come to have a property in several parts of
that which God gave to Mankind in common, and that without
any express Compact of all the Commoners" (25) . Chapter 2
(below) explores Locke's state of nature/natural law
arguments.
47

Adam's Sovereignty, if by vertue of being Proprietor of
the whole world, he had any Authority over Men, could
not have been inherited by any of his Children over the
rest, because they had the same Title to divide the
Inheritance . . • So neither could Adam's Sovereignty
by Right of Fatherhood, if any such he had, descend to
any one of his Children.51
Even if Locke could accept that Adam had monarchial power,
he could not accept that any of Adam's descendants are owed
his obedience, because he denies primogeniture.
Tyrrell, like Locke, denies that Adam was granted
original absolute monarchial power and ownership of the
goods of the earth.
to society in common.

Instead, he insists, God gave the world
In Patriarcha non Monarcha, Tyrrell

writes that "Adams absolute dominion over the lives and
persons of his Children is not to be deduced from that place
of Genesis," for dominion was "given unto them both [Adam
and Eve] joyntly" and "it does not appear that this Dominion
was personal to Adam and Eve alone. 11 52

All mankind created

enjoyed the goods of the world God created, for it would not
be rational or
consonant to scripture, that God gave Adam such a
despotick power over all things; for since all the
Children of Adam had as much right to their lives as
Adam had himself, it must likewise follow, that they
had as good a right to the fruits of the earth, which
were then the only means to maintain it.53
In addition to denying that God gave Adam ownership
rights to the earth, neither Tyrrell nor Locke will accept

51. Locke, First Treatise, 98.
52. Tyrrell, 101-102, 2nd pagination.
53. Tyrrell, 102-103, 2nd pagination.
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Filmer's idea that Adam was ever absolute monarch.

By

disagreeing with Filmer's interpretation of Genesis, Locke
and Tyrrell destroyed the foundation which Filmer uses to
construct his patriarchal theory.

If Adam was never

absolute monarch, then there must be some other explanation
for man's early organization on earth.

From this starting

point, Locke and Tyrrell develop state of nature political
theories.
Another sticking point in Filmer's theory is his use of
the Fifth Commandment.

Filmer uses the Fifth Commandment to

give fathers and kings absolute power (and to receive
absolute obedience from) their families and subjects.

Locke

particularly attacked Filmer's analysis of the ·commandment.
While Filmer used the Fifth Commandment to prove that
fatherly and kingly power are the same, Locke will not
accept that it has any connection to political power.

In

his First Treatise, Locke lets his readers know that
Filmer's use of the Fifth Commandment is remarkable.

He

wonders
how our A. infers from the 5th Commandment, that all
Power was originally in the Father. How he finds
Monarchial Power of Government. settled and fixed by
the Commandment, Honour thy Father and thy Mother.54
because he does not grant the mother power, although "God
afterwards all along joyn the Mother with him, to share in
this Honour."55

Locke is saying that Filmer is contorting

54. Locke, First Treatise, 62.
55. Ibid.
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scripture to suit his purpose.

If Filmer's reading of the

Fifth Commandment can be discredited, then his argument that
monarchial power is seated in one absolute sovereign, the
father of his country, can also be discredited.

If both

husband and wife share power over their children, they must
both be accepted as holding family power and a line cannot
be drawn from father to king as absolute rulers.

While he

does deny that fathers and kings are absolute rulers, Locke
does not deny that children should honor their parents; he
believes children owe "a perpetual obligation of honouring
their Parents" with "an inward esteem and reverence to be
shewn by all outward Expressions."56

For Locke, the Fifth

Commandment links filial obedience with obedience to God,
understood to be essential for the good order of society.57
The commandment links obedience to parents with obedience to
God because it is a bridge between the first four
commandments (to God) and the last five commandments (to
other people).58

If a reader accepts Locke's criticism of

Filmer's reading of the Fifth Commandment, Filmer's
patriarchal theory is put in jeopardy.

If the father has to

share parental power with his wife, no line of patriarchy
can be drawn from the father to sovereign.
Even as a different reading of Genesis and the Fifth

56. Locke, Second Treatise, 66.
57. Foster, 665.
58. Ibid.
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Commandment can weaken the position Filmer has given to
fathers and monarchs, Locke and Tyrrell can accept
patriarchal origins of society without arriving at the same
conclusions that Filmer reaches.

In Locke's Second

Treatise, Chapter Six is devoted to paternal power.

"Of

Paternal Power" argues that the major problem with
patriarchalism is its equating of paternal and political
power.

Locke writes, describing the exclusion of

mothers from power, that patriarchalists are only writing to
reach the conclusions they want:
running into those gross mistakes they have made, about
this Power of Parents: which, however it might,
without any great harshness, bear the name of Absolute
Dominion, and Regal Authority, when under the Title of
Parental Power it seem'd appropriated to the Father
• • • it belong'd to the Mother too; for it will but
very ill serve the turn of those Men who contend so
much for the Absolute Power and Authority of the
Fatherhood • • • would have but ill supported the
Monarchy they contend for.59
As this important passage demonstrates, when patriarchalists
equate paternal power seated in the husband and the king, a
gross mistake is being made because families arose under a
joint power of mothers and fathers.

Although Locke may be

going against the practical experience of male-dominated
Stuart households, where the father has the power, he can
argue that the father only has power in this case because
the wife has entrusted her power to him.60
Society arose from patriarchal origins, but not in the
59. Locke, Second Treatise, 53.
60. Ibid., 82-83.
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manner argued by patriarchalists.

For Locke, the family is

"a profoundly problematic institution that cannot, as the
patriarchalists contend, supply a foundation or model for
political order."61

Locke distanced himself from

patriarchal theory, denying even an analogous relationship
between organized states and families.

David Foster

maintains the "separation of paternal from political power
may be fundamental separation of powers in Locke."62

In

addition, Locke's critique of patriarchalism is "a critical
reflection on the natural and divine context of human
life."63
One's life, Locke argues, is only guided by the parents
until the child reaches an age of maturity and is only
guided during this time for preservation, nourishment, and
education.

In the Second Treatise, Locke explains his

belief that
the Father's Power of commanding extends no farther
than the Minority of his Children, and to a degree only
fit for the Discipline and Government of that Age.64
As the passage indicates, it must be understood that for
Locke, paternal power is not natural power.

Paternal power

is more in reference to guardianship that to control or
ownership: "Only as he is Guardian of his children, that
when he loses his care of them, he loses his power over

61.
62.
63.
64.

Foster, 662.
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Ibid., 643-644.
Locke, Second Treatise, 74.
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them."65

In a passage described as "one of the most

dramatic and compelling passages in the Two Treatises,"
Locke elaborates this point.66

Demonstrating that parents

do not own their children because they begat them, any more
than monarchs own their subjects, Locke claims that God gave
people being, not parents.

His passage reads:

They who say the Father gives Life to his Children,
so dazzled with the thoughts of Monarchy, that they
not, as they ought, remember God, who is the Author
Giver of Life: 'Tis in him alone we live. move, and
have our Being. How can he be thought to give life
another, that knows not wherein his own Life
consists?67

are
do
and
to

By arguing that fathers did not own the lives of their
children, Locke shows by analogy that monarchs do not own
the lives of their subjects.

Not only is human life divine,

and parental power unnatural, but equating political society
and families is impossible.

According to Locke, it is

ridiculous for any person to derive political power from a
fatherly power which is unnatural and inequitable.
Like Locke, Tyrrell does not accept that families are
the foundation for government.

While believing organized

states and the family are analogous, a position Daly
describes as the general royalist and non-Filmerian
position, he does not need historical connections for
contemporary government in the way that Filmer does.68

65.
66.
67.
68.
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Tyrrell does not need this connection because he relies on
natural law for his vision of contemporary government, in
which man has evolved from a state of nature; an evolution
which does not depend on historical examples.69

In

contrast, Filmer, who does believe the family and state are
equal, and not merely analogous, needs historical
connections for his patriarchal theory (which is where the
importance of his Genesis argument lays).

Against Filmer's

use of history, in Patriarcha non Monarcha, Tyrrell writes
I will not deny that the Heads of separate Families,
being out of Commonwealths, have many things analogous
to them, though they are not Commonwealths
themselves.70
Among the things which Tyrrell mentions as being similar are
the "power of Life and Death in great Offences, and also of
making War and Peace."71

In the end, however, "the ends of

a Family and a Commonwealth are divers: and so many parts of
a Monarchial Empire are not to be found in Families."72
Tyrrell also denies Filmer's insistence that the power
of fathers and, thus, monarchs, is unlimited.

For the

sovereign to be absolute in Filmer's theory, fathers must be
absolute because their power is the basis for the
sovereign's power.

According to one scholar, "Among the

most startling of Filmerian contentions was that of the

69. Chapter Three (below) explores Tyrrell's reliance
on natural law in his political theory.
70. Tyrrell, 25.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
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father's right of life and death over his children. 11 73

To

Tyrrell, though, power is necessarily limited by its ends.
He explains a son will have grounds to protect himself from
arbitrary life and death actions of his father:
So that if a Son have any Right to defend himself in
what belongs to him from unjust violence of his father,
he doth not act as his Superior; but in this case as
his Equal, as his is indeed in all the Rights of
Nature, considered Equal, as he is indeed in all the
Rights of Nature, considered only as a Man; Such as
are a Right to live, and to preserve himself, and to
use all lawful means for that end.74
By analogy, Tyrrell provides the argument that if a father
does not have life and death powers over his children, then
a king will not have life and death powers over his
subjects.

Using this argument, fatherly and kingly power

cannot be as absolute as Filmer claims.
In rejection of Filmer's patriarchal society, "Tyrrell
put forward a quite different model" where
the people were not just a mass of theoretically equal
political units but an organic and articulated whole
composed of parts which were related to each other
through different types of subordination sanctioned by
natural laws of association.75
Answering patriarchal arguments with natural law arguments,
Tyrrell was changing the foundation of battle between
himself and Filmer.

In a larger sense, Filmer had changed

the battle between the Whigs and Tories.
More realistic than Filmer's society, Tyrrell's model

73. Daly, 169.
74. Tyrrell, 26.
75. Daly, 92.
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relied on natural law, arising from a peaceful state of
nature, where property was a major concern.

The Whigs were

moving away from arguments focusing on history to natural
law arguments and Patriarcha non Monarcha reveals this
movement by centering around relevant issues of liberty
associated with the exclusion crisis.

By refuting Filmer

with natural law arguments, Tyrrell should have become a
major political theorist.

Outdistancing Locke in specific

mention of historical arguments used by Filmer, Tyrrell's
arguments against patriarchalism probably seemed more vital
to their contemporaries.76
Locke's Two Treatises is the supreme example of the
Whig movement from historical argument to natural law
argument.

In the First Treatise, he explains that past

behavior is not appropriate for what ought to be.

He

conceded to patriarchalists that
the natural Father of Families, by an insensible
change, became the politick Monarchs of them too . • .
they chanced to live long, and leave able, and worthy
heirs • • • they laid the foundations of Hereditary, or
Elective Kingdoms, under several constitutions and
Manners, according as Chance, Contrivance, or Occasions
happen'd to mould them.77
Despite conceding that governments had patriarchal origins,
Locke would not accept history as a guide to what is
reasonable.

He remarks that

76. Tyrrell, 226ff.
77. Locke, First Treatise, 76.
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if the Example of what hath been done, be the Role of
what ought to be, History would have furnished our A--[Filmer] with instances of this Absolute Fatherly Power
in its heighth and perfection.78
Locke decided that historical instances can be used to
provide the opposite.

History can provide opposite

examples, such as Peruvians who had children just "to Fatten
and Eat them. 11 79

The Peruvians in this supposed historical

example did not act reasonably.
should be man's guide.

Reason alone, Locke feels,

Based on reason, his political

theory provides a refutation of Filmer's patriarchalism and
puts the family "on a footing of property affection, and
anticipated equality between parent and child, rather than
on mutual duties, fear or reverence, and permanent
hierarchy. 11 80
Seemingly, after Locke's Two Treatises were published,
the issue of patriarchalism as a valid political theory was
eliminated.

Nevertheless, Schochet believes that it was not

Locke that defeated patriarchalism.

Instead, patriarchalism

was defeated because it became irrelevant as a political
symbol as the seventeenth century progressed into the
eighteenth.81

During this time, the rational outlook which

Locke championed replaced the scriptural authority which
Filmer believed in.

In addition, there was an emphasis

placed on the distinction between state and society, which
78.
79.
80.
81.

Ibid., 57.
Ibid.
Foster, 669.
Schochet, 274.
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Filmer considered as the same through his linking of kings
and fathers.

Because Filmer relied on "a genetic conception

of history and the denial of the possibility of fundamental
change," his theory is a show of what would be the "new
conception of political obligation:" logical and rational
validity rather than historical and legal validity.82
As a defense of state of nature theories, and the
rejection of genetic theories, Locke and Tyrrell agreed that
no matter what the argument, political absolutism was not
feasible.

In doing so, Locke and Tyrrell revealed that the

perception of political practice affected its realities.83
In other words, if people wanted to believe in state of
nature political theories rather than Filmer's biblical
patriarchalism, they had every right to believe they were
responsible for the institution of government.

In essence,

"patriarchal ism would no longer suffice as a theory of
political obligation because it did not conform to the way
of viewing the world that Locke himself did so much to
establish. 11 84

Tyrrell's role is not to be forgotten,

either, for he may have seen the problems with Filmer's
patriarchalism even more clearly than Locke.

By rejecting

Filmer's patriarchalism, Locke and Tyrrell turned towards
political theories which had the state of nature as their

82. Ibid., 135.
83. Ibid. I 272.
84. Ibid. I 268.
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foundation rather than a historical approach to politics.
Largely because of Filmer's Patriarcha, and other
royalist works like it, the Whigs adopted a political
position which stressed that government must be judged by
how its subjects rights are protected and served, rather
than by it history.

When Filmer gained notice as a

political theorist, during the exclusion crisis, he
played a major role in
ideology--based almost
unhesitating assertion
which the theorists of
answer.85

establishing that Tory
for the first time on an
of the crown's sovereignty--to
the opposition had to find an

Because of Filmer's role, the Whigs had to show that common
law, the basis for property rights, had existed from the
beginning of English history or admit that it was created
by, or originated under, a sovereign.86

For the English

people, the sovereign would have been the monarch.

If

common law did originate under the king, the king would be
supreme over the law and absolute in the country.

On the

other hand, if a date or origin for common law could not be
discovered, personal liberties, such as property, secured
under that law would be safe and valid.

For the Tory party,

custom, "the historical limitation of right," could not be
binding unless an authority can make it law, which would
make the sovereign superior over custom and demonstrate that
85. J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the
Feudal Law: A Study of Historical Thought in the
Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Cambridge
University Press, 1957), 187.
86. Ibid., 190.
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every law must have a beginning.87
Filmer devotes some attention to describing beliefs
which would later become the crux of Tory beliefs in custom
and common law in Patriarcha.

He describes common law:

The common law is called unwritten not for that it is
not written at all, but because it was not written by
the first devisers or makers of it. The common law
• is the 'common custom of the realm.'88
Needing to define custom to develop his definition of common
law, Filmer writes,
Custom at first became lawful only by some superior
power which did either command or consent unto their
beginning. And, the first power which we find (as is
confessed by all men) is kingly power, which was both
in this nation and in all other nations of the world
long before any laws or any other kind of government
was thought of .89
By incorporating definitions of common law and custom in his
work, Filmer attempts to prove that the king is supreme over
all law that his opponents feel is the true guide of man.
According to Filmer, the king is supreme over common law
because the king made common law lawful.

In essence, common

law owes its existence to the power of the king.
Party ideas about custom and common law, as expressed
in Patriarcha, gave the Tories "a vested interest in
historical research" and the Whigs a vested interest in
refuting their history.

That is, Tories looked to view

origins, which they rightly suspected to be found in kingly

87. Ibid., 163.
88. Filmer, 45.
89. Ibid.
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acts, while Whigs hoped to keep constitutional origins
shrouded in mist.

Thus, largely because of Filmer, the

Tory-Whig debates included a concentration on English
history.
J.G.A. Pocock supports the argument that the parties
focused on history, by admirably demonstrating in The
Ancient Constitution and Feudal Law, writing "nearly every
thinker noted for his contribution to political theory .
devoted part of his pages to discussing the antiquity of the
constitution. 11 90

However, Pocock claims, Locke is an

exception because he was "exceptional . . • in omitting any
discussion of English legal or constitutional history. 11 91
Richard Ashcraft disagrees.

Ashcraft explains his belief

that Locke's omission of history and the constitution "in
relation to the political debate of the 1680s" was of "very
little significance."92

Locke's omission is of little

importance because the debate was not "structured around a
historical approach to the political problems of exclusion
and the limits of political obligation. 11 93

According to

Ashcraft, "Locke was not an exceptional political writer in
his rejection of a legalistic approach."94

Although

Ashcraft's Revolutionary Politics and Locke's "Two
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Treatises" is an exceptional addition to Lockean
scholarship, his argument is flawed.

Pocock may place too

much stress on the importance of a Whig-Tory argument of
historical evolution,

but, by not giving it any importance,

Ashcraft is seriously undermining the range of issues during
the 1680s.95
Though history was not the focal point, it was a way
for the Tories to assert the superiority of their political
position.96

When Filmer uses patriarchal theory to

demonstrate a line of succession from Adam to the present
monarch, he is using history as his guide.

Admittedly,

Filmer weakened his own argument because his "absolutism
caused him to ignore the complexities of the medieval
structure and diminished the extent to which his thought was
genuinely historical," leading him to exclude historical
evolution.97

On the other hand, both Locke and Tyrrell

adopted a natural law justification for individual liberties
because they were led to that position to force a contrast
with Filmer's insistence on the historical allegiances by

95. See Knights especially.
96. By history, I am adopting the definition given by
The American College Dictionary (New York, New York: Random
House, 1966): "a continuous, systematic written narrative,
in order of time, of past events as relating to a particular
people, country, period, person, etc." (574). This
definition of history, relating past event that actually
occurred, often leads to a legal basis for custom and common
law. I am not referring to history as an assumed evolution,
which both Locke and Tyrrell accept as an outgrowth of their
natural law theories.
97. Pocock, 155.
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which people owe their loyalty and liberties to the king.
For those writers that do not believe the king enjoys an
absolute power over his subjects, he merely remarks that
"[l]ater writers have taken up too much upon trust."98
Filmer suggests that writers should "trust experience before
speculations philosophical."99
On the other hands, the Whigs present natural law
arguments. These natural law arguments most strongly reveal
the radicalism of the Whigs.100

Nevertheless, history is

still included in the Whig argument because leading
theorists, including Tyrrell and Petyt, argue that
Parliament predates the Norman Conquest and trace
liberties to the Anglo-Saxons.101

In opposition, the Tories

rejected the theory of the ancient constitution, partly
because of the Brady Controversy.

In the Brady Controversy,

Dr. Robert Brady showed that Parliament was created by the
crown in the late-medieval period, which means that
Parliament is subordinate to its creator, the King.

With

the support of the Brady Controversy, the Tories could adopt
a position where the use of historical references was their
way to prove that the king should be absolute.
Ashcraft misleadingly claims that Filmer said there was
not any point in appealing to historical law precedents, as

98.
99.
100.
101.

Filmer, 5.
Ibid., 29.
Harris, Politics Under the Later Stuarts, 90.
Ibid., 89.
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was done in the Brady Controversy, so that Locke and Tyrrell
"were compelled to counter a natural law argument with one
of their own in order to defend the 'fundamentals of
government.

111

102

Although Locke and Tyrrell adopted a

natural law approach, they did not accept this approach
because Filmer had already adopted that position.

In fact,

Filmer writes, the populist position is false because "it is
not to be found in the ancient Fathers and doctors of the
primitive church.

It contradicts the history of the Holy

Scriptures, the constant practice of all ancient
monarchies."103

Based on biblical and monarchial history,

Filmer's political theory could be used to deflate the
political stance of the Whigs.
Tyrrell made historical references in Patriarcha non
Monarcha and found history to be very important.

As shown

by his plans for a three volume History of England
(1697,1700,1704), he regarded history
not as a search for answers, perhaps only tentative, to
questions about the past, but as interpretations,
either right or wrong, of a definite body of facts, or
truths, recorded and known.104
Even Tyrrell's method of writing is important because it
"reveals his whole conception of the meaning of history."105
Tyrrell's historical references and method serve as a
backdrop and a justification for his considerations of
102.
103.
104.
105.

Ashcraft, 189.
Filmer, 3.
Gough, 505.
Ibid.
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natural law.

In Patriarcha non Monarcha he plans to show

his readers "Since then all the Laws of Nature, or reason,
are intended for one end or effect, viz., the common good
and preservation of Mankind" that the history of marriage-important for refuting Filmer--is a result of natural
law.106

While Tyrrell incorporates historical references

into his work, his method of writing serves to make these
references a backdrop to his natural law arguments.
Despite his own historical studies, Tyrrell considered
Petyt his superior in the subject.

He asked Petyt to

provide a discussion of historical interests particular to
the 1680s, which resulted in The Ancient Constitution of the
Commons of England Asserted, a book which Tyrrell refers to
his readers.107

In his book, Petyt argues that parliament

and the law are immemorial and known to be so in 49 H.3, the
year the Tories believe is when the Commons started to meet
regularly.108

While the Tories may have been correct in

their dating, and the claim that there was a time when the
King's council met without the Commons, Petyt insists that
people knew the rights they were entitled to, even though
they did not practice those rights.

In addition, Petyt

could argue that English history was not continuous (because
William ruled as a conqueror) so that any claim to dating is

106. Tyrrell, 15.
107. Pocock, 188.
108. Ibid., 191.
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nothing but a broken record.
Although historical references were not important to
his political theory, which was presented in the abstract,
Locke was willing to explain nature by looking into the
past, though not accepting historical examples as producing
values.

As Gordon Schochet explains, for Locke, "origins

• • . led to government in a prudential rather than
necessary sense,"

meaning that historical references were

fine as long as they did not overstep their purpose and
become absolute.109

Locke writes in the Second Treatise

that even though "Contenders for Paternal Empire" may be
granted that governments may have originally been founded on
paternal rights,
they would do well not to search too much into the
Original of Governments, as they have begun de facto,
lest they should find at the foundation of most of
them, something very little favourable to the design
they promote, and such a power as they contend for.110
The problem Locke foresees is "Reason being plain on our
side, that Men are naturally free. 11 111

In other words, no

matter what historical references the Tories can find to
argue that the king should be absolute, reason will always
prevail in showing that history should not be man's
political guide.
Because the Whigs would lose a historical debate with

109. Schochet, 260.
110. Locke, Second Treatise, 103.
111. Ibid.
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the Tories they owe their focus on a natural law argument to
their opposition.112

The fact that Locke makes only one

reference to constitutional and legal history in the Second
Treatise, where he merely refers his readers to other works
on the subject, reveals his indifference to historical
fact.113

He was an exceptional Whig in this respect.

It

may have been because Petyt shifted his argument from Filmer
to immemorial common law that Locke shifted the debate away
from history.114

Whatever the reason, Locke "understood

that the security of political liberty in the seventeenth
century did not really depend on the interpretation of what
happened in the eleventh. 11 115

Perhaps as a response to

Petyt, and certainly as a contrast to Filmer, Locke did not
appeal to history.
Without an appeal to history, no new findings could
prove Locke incorrect.

Locke's Two Treatises were

at once a response to a particular political
situation and a statement of universal principle, made
as such and still read as such . . . [making) the
discussion of politics so completely independent of
historical example, so entirely autonomous an area of
discourse.116
Locke, the supreme example of a Whig political theorist
resting on an argument of natural law, reveals his party's

112. The Whigs did not just concede the Tories their
historical argument, although this is what Ashcraft claims
in his Revolutionary Politics (214).
113. Pocok, 239.
114. Ibid., 237.
115. Gough, 588.
116. Laslett, "Introduction," 91.
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movement as a contrast to Tory historical arguments.
In their refutation of Filmer, there were some issues
that Locke and Tyrrell attempted to demolish and other
issues that they attempted to avoid.

In attempting to

demolish Filmer's patriarchal theory, Locke and Tyrrell
revealed that if a reader did not agree with Filmer's
interpretation of Genesis or of the Fifth Commandment, a lot
of his theory fell apart.

Genesis and the Fifth Commandment

served as a foundation for Filmer's insistence that the king
was both absolute and a father to his subjects; if Filmer's
interpretations were rejected, then the foundation of his
theory was pushed over.

In addition, Locke and Tyrrell were

able to show that the acceptance of patriarchal
origins of society did not have to lead to inevitable
absolute monarchy.

While accepting patriarchal origins,

Locke does not even consider society and the family to be
analogous and Tyrrell will only accept that they are
analogous to some extent; neither man will accept that
society and the family are the same.

While attempting to

demolish Filmer's interpretations of Genesis and the Fifth
Commandment, as well as the outcome of patriarchal origins
of society, Locke and Tyrrell attempted to avoid historical
arguments.

Both men did agree that history was an important

area of study, but Tyrrell relied on historical examples
only to a limited degree and Locke omitted mention of
history altogether.

For both men, history was a supplement
68

to their natural law theories, and certainly not anything
more.
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Chapter Two
John Locke's Political Theory: Natural Law and Property
Locke helped to establish the law of nature as a
binding law within political society during the seventeenth
century because of Whig problems with historical arguments
arising from the Exclusion Crisis.

Described as "the law of

God in fact and knowledge," natural law led seventeenth
century political theorists, including Locke, to believe
that man acted morally because he understood that to do so
would be to follow God's law.1

Natural law entitles man to

the natural right of self-preservation and to the duty to
fulfill this right.2

It was Locke's nemesis, Filmer, who

directed Locke towards an argument based on natural law
which men must obey.
Discourse on Property:

According to James Tully, author of

A

John Locke and His Adversaries, in

Locke's political theory,
the presence and widespread awareness of Filmer's
critique renders a consistent natural law theory of
property a necessary precondition.3
By moving towards an argument based on natural law, Locke
responded to Filmer's patriarchal arguments without having
to respond to his historical arguments.
Locke believed the law of nature is most fully realized
in a state of nature.

This state is "the condition in which

1. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago,
Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), 203.
2. James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke
and His Adversaries (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge
University Press, 1980), 62-63.
3. Ibid., 54-55.
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the executive power of the law of nature remains exclusively
in the hands of individuals and has not been made
communal."4

It is "a State of perfect Freedom .

without • . . depending upon the Will of any other man" and
"a State also of Equality, wherein all the power and
Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than
another."5

In his state of nature, natural law was binding,

but unwritten, so that no man was a competent judge of what
actions taken by another man are right or wrong.6
Even without an established judge, in the state of
nature all men are free and equal and live together
peacefully.

As W. Von Leyden argues, the law of nature sets

bounds within this state as to what each man is allowed to
appropriate and keep.7

These bounds keep man within his own

circle of interests, without conflict between him and
others.

Furthermore, because all men are willing to act

morally, according to God's law, there will not be any
conflict over what each man will appropriate.

A way to

avoid conflict in appropriation is the limitation that each
man must leave enough goods so that other men will be able
to appropriate enough to survive.

If each man is able to

collect enough goods for his own needs, there is no reason
4. Laslett, "Introduction," 111.
5. Locke, Second Treatise, 4.
6. Ibid. I 136.
7. W. Von Leyden, "John Locke and Natural Law," Life,
Liberty, and Property: Essays on Locke's Political Ideas,
ed. Gordon J. Schochet (Belmont, California: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1971), 15.
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men cannot live together peacefully in a state of nature.
Despite the peacefulness of the state of nature, the
continued appropriation of goods provides a reason for man
to move towards the formation of political society.
According to Locke, when man eventually and inevitably makes
his move from a state of nature into political society, he
does so for the preservation of his personal property.
Despite this move, the obligations of natural law remain in
political society, providing the justification for municipal
laws.a

Natural law is important in Locke's political theory

because it remains during and after man's movement from a
state of nature to a state of political society, remaining
the overriding force of man's motivation in both states.

As

Leo Strauss explains, "Locke's political teaching stands or
falls by his natural law teaching concerning the beginning
of political society."9

In fact, Locke's entire "political

teaching" rests on his assumptions about a state of nature.
Locke's faith in a state of nature is open to attack.
For example, George Sabine criticizes the state of nature as
a fiction which must be laid aside to see the real meaning
of Locke's work, which is that moral rules are broader than
positive laws and that morality makes law, rather than law

8. Ibid., 15.
9. Strauss, 215.
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making morality.IO

Sabine implies that Locke uses a

construct which is not real to base the rights of man upon.
If a state of nature never existed, there is no actual
justification for man's rights, including the right to
private property, which is Locke's model for all other
natural rights, including consent, freedom, and reason.

In

truth, Locke's concept of natural law is an assertion that
man, above all, should act morally in political society.
Despite Sabine's criticism, it is imperative to treat the
state of nature during a reading of the Second Treatise, as
a valid theoretical construct, even if fictious, of early
man because Locke used it for that purpose; he was able to
use the state of nature for the basis of the law of nature.
He does not argue that morality makes law, in spite of
Sabine's interpretation.

The state of nature is Locke's

basis for man's appropriation of private property, as well
as his other rights, and his evolution towards political
society.
Other criticisms of Locke are fair.

For instance, one

commentator writes that, according to Locke, natural law was
at one and the same time a command of God, a rule of
reason, and a law in the very nature of things as they
are, by which they work and we work too,
but must admit that Locke never analyzes natural law as a
term.11

In his clearest definition of natural law, Locke

10. Sabine, 526.
11. Laslett, "Introduction," 95, 97.
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merely claims that it is "Reason, which is that Law. 11 12
Reason, he continues, serves as a teacher to "All Mankind,
who will but consult it, that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life,
Health, Liberty, or Possessions."13

Particularly

unrevealing, Locke's definitions of reason and natural law
are not expanded on more than these two quotes.

In fact,

although most Lockean scholars admit that "the notion of
natural law can be seen to be of central importance in his
treatise on Civil Goverment," they also accept that Locke
never tries to give an elaborate description to the concepts
of reason, the state of nature, and natural law.14
Perhaps Locke never elaborates on natural law because
he realizes that it was in conflict with theology.

In the

Second Treatise, Locke expresses this realization when he
writes,
But though this be a State of Liberty, yet it is not a
State of Licence, though Man is in that State have an
uncontrollable liberty, to dispose of his Person or
Possessions, yet he has not Liberty to destroy
himself.15
In other words, man's natural right to himself as property
cannot conflict with the moral obedience he owes to God not
to destroy himself.

Locke reveals the conflict between

natural law and theology in another instance, writing that

12.
13.
14.
15.

Locke, Second Treatise, 6.
Ibid.
Von Leyden, 12.
Locke, Second Treatise, 6.
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man must choose between
Whether we consider natural Reason, which tells us that
Men, being once born, have a right to their
Preservation • • • Or Revelation, which gives us an
account of those Grants God made of the World to Adam,
and to Noah, and his Sons.16
As this passage suggests, Locke believes there is a clear
distinction between what Reason tells man and what
Revelation reveals to man.
Although Locke's state of nature has been criticized as
nothing but a state of fiction, he blends his ideas of
natural law with the growing late-seventeenth century
concept of property as a justification of personal
liberties.

Through this blend, Locke is able to develop a

radical theory of property.

While his work helped to

develop the contours of the late seventeenth century concept
of property as a preservation of political liberties with a
foundation in natural law, Locke was able to explain how man
in the state of nature moved towards political society for
the preservation of personal property.
property is an extension of natural law.

In a sense, private
While natural law

provides man freedom for what is another's, it does not
define what belongs to other men.

Private property, as an

extension of natural law, does explain what is another•s.17
In addition, because Locke did not present an historical
argument, for his political theory "to appear at all

16. Ibid., 25.
17. Tully, 83.
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plausible to his immediate audience, he had to show that
property, and equality, could be explained in a way
consistent with natural law."18

Locke had to show that his

theory was consistent with natural law because he rejected
historical arguments, which was the accepted method for
developing a political theory.
Although Locke's property definition is not specific,
there is a dual conception within his definition:

both

material goods and ideal benefits, "Lives, Liberties, and
Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property."19

The

ideal benefits of this definition relate to the lives and
liberties of man, suggesting that property is more than just
tangible goods, but part of a person's being.

On the other

hand, material goods are also a component of Locke's
definition, the estates, suggesting that property is also
composed of tangible products, such as land.
Locke's dual conception of property reflects the
seventeenth century trend of moving towards definitions of
property which bridge the ideological {lives and liberties)
and the economic {estates).

Attempting to put Locke's

definition into historical perspective, Sibyl Schwarzenbach
argues that it arose from the controversy surrounding the
Exclusion Crisis because Locke needed a way to justify
legitimate political authority and "justification for the

18. Ibid., 54-55.
19. Locke, Second Treatise, 123.
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rights and property of individuals prior to and independent
of government. 11 20

According to this argument, Locke wrote

his property theory as a defense of individual rights and
goods arising out of the constructs of political society.
Moving away from historical arguments, his focus was shifted
to defending property through natural law.
Locke's political theory was radical.

He implies that

man, though living in peace within the state of nature,
created political society for the preservation and
protection of private property.

Private property, which

originated in the state of nature, antedates the creation of
government.

As Locke writes,

I shall endeavour to shew, how Men might come to have a
property in several parts of that which God gave to
Mankind in common, and that without any express Compact
of all the Commoners.21
By arguing that private property antedates civil society
Locke is claiming that property is independent of, and not
created by, society because private property antedates civil
society.

Chapter Five of the Second Treatise explains this

claim.
Chapter Five of the Second Treatise also provides
Locke's belief in the labor theory of property.

The labor

theory of property states that people appropriate private
property by joining their labor with goods or an object.

20. Sibyl Schwarzenbach, "Locke's Two Conceptions of
Property," Social Theory and Practice 14, 2 (1988): 142.
21. Locke, Second Treatise, 25.
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This theory is considered among "the most influential
statements he ever made."22

Locke's labor theory of

property is:
Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature
hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour
with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and
thereby makes it his Property.23
Man's labor puts a value on property.

By joining his labor

with an object, man gives that object value.

In Locke's

words, "'tis Labour indeed that puts the difference of value
on every thing."24

The labor theory of value was

revolutionary because it means that man's own effort, his
labor, is responsible for what he has that is valuable.25
The theory of property found in "Of Property" was radical
because it argued that property antedates the formation of
government, which is established to preserve it, and is
given value when man mixes his labor with goods or an
object.

Before Locke, few political theorists had given any

prominence to property in considerations of political
origins.26
The state of nature is essential to Locke's theory of
property for it is in that state where man begins to
appropriate private property.

For Locke, the state of

nature was not just a "hypothetical assumption," but an

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Laslett, "Introduction," 114.
Locke, Second Treatise, 27.
Ibid. I 40.
Strauss, 248.
Laslett, "Introduction," 114.
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actual early state of people.

Locke devoted the entire

second chapter of the Second Treatise to "Of the State of
Nature."

Quite simply, the state of nature was

a state without government where the laws of nature conduct
a person's actions.

Although Locke did not recognize any

law of nature "in the proper sense of the term," he conceded
that nature set limits on what man may appropriate.27
Natural law in a state of nature and with regard to property
is directed towards preventing waste, with each man
appropriating what he can for his immediate needs.28
There is no real demonstration of proof within the
Second Treatise that preservation of waste is what actually
occurs in a state of nature, but Locke proceeds in a stepby-step description to explain how man moves from this state
towards political society.

Because of Locke's method, he

has been attacked as holding a "sentimental trust in nature"
which had "no logical ground" other than the "vague
assumption" that harmony would be found in nature.29

On the

other hand, because Locke did give man's step-by-step
movement from a state of nature to political society,
following the law of nature, one commentator praises him for
raising the study of natural law to a demonstrative
science.JO

27.
28.
29.
30.

Most scholars accept that Locke equated lawful

Strauss, 220.
Ibid., 237.
Sabine, 529.
Strauss, 202.
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property rights with natural property rights, as a link
between natural and political societies.31

In Locke's

opinion, morality as the outcome of natural law is not
distinct from what is legally actionable; the law of nature
is a law.

Natural law remains the foundation of both the

state of nature and political society, despite man's shift
in organization.

Property is vital to this shift.

Laslett states,
it is through the theory of property that men can
.
proceed from the abstract world of liberty and equality
based on their relationship with God and natural law,
to the concrete world of political liberty guaranteed
by political arrangements.32
Man's appropriation of property is the bridge between a
state of nature and political society, both states ruled by
natural law, explained step-by-step by Locke in the Second
Treatise.
It is important to understand Locke's step-by-step
explanation of man's movement from a state of nature to a
state of political society because that movement is the
central focus of his Second Treatise.

Robert A. Goldwin

provides an insight as to why Locke proceeds in this way by
stating "the central theme of Locke's whole political
teaching: [is] increase."33

By proceeding from a state of

31. For example, see Sabine (536-537) and Strauss
( 202) .
32. Laslett, "Introduction," 117.
33. Robert A. Goldwin, "John Locke, 1632-1704," Historv
of Political Philosophy, ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey
(Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally and Company, 1963), 250.
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nature where the major limitation of private property and
accumulation is the spoiling of products, to possessing
money in a state of nature to by used for the enlargement of
possessions beyond immediate needs, to the creation of
goverment for the protection of private property, Locke's
political man is moving from a state of penury to a state of
plenty.

Thus, Locke provides a detailed analysis of man's

evolution from a state of nature to a state of political
society.
In the beginning of man's social evolution, no one
owned anything other than that each man owned himself.
According to Locke,
Though the Earth, an all inferior Creatures by common
to all Men, yet every man has a Property in his own
Person. This no Body has any right to but himself .34
All other property is derivative from the condition that man
has property in himself.

By adding his labour to other

goods, man makes those goods his own.35

The only limitation

on man's creating his own goods are that he must leave
enough for others' needs, taking only what he can use before
it spoils.

Locke presents the spoilage limitation as

follows:
As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of
life before it spoils; so much he may by his labour fix
a Property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than
his share, and belongs to others.36

34. Locke, Second Treatise, 27.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 31.
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Land, in addition to other goods, can be gained as private
property by joining it with labor.

As Locke contends,

I think it is plain, that Property in that too [land]
is acquired as the former. As much land as a Man
Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the
Product of, so much is his Property. He by his labour
does, as it were, inclose it from the common.37
Man's labor gives him title to the land and other goods
because it instills those things with value.

Value or price

is determined by "quantity or vent," similar to supply and
demand.38

Because man produces a quantity of goods through

his labor, the goods are given value because they have been
appropriated.

Likewise, because land has been made

productive by man's labor it has been given value.

At

first, appropriated goods and productive land will be scarce
so that they are valuable.

By the time that there are

appropriated goods and productive land, it is obvious that
private property has come into existence, arising from man's
property in himself.
Locke has been attacked for accepting spoiling as a
limitation of man's appropriation of property.39

Indeed,

there does not seem to be a reason why any type of
limitation would be needed in the overabundance found in a
state of nature.

However, if there was a scarcity of

possible property, labor cannot establish a title to

37. Ibid., 32.
38. Goldwin, 445.
39. Ibid., 447.
82

property because everyone would be competing for something
that could not go around.

Goods and land were not scarce,

so that waste was inevitable.
nature is worth nothing.

The waste found in a state of

For instance,

Land that is left wholly to Nature, that hath no
improvement of Pasturage, Tillage, or Planting, is
called, as indeed it is, wast; and we shall find the
benefit of it amount to little more than nothing.40
By accepting waste within the state of nature, Locke
provides a way to justify his property theory as a
liberation for man from this waste; from a state of nature.
When man finally began to cultivate land and produce
more than just what his family needed, money was invented
for incentive.

Locke writes,

And thus came in the use of Money, some lasting thing
that Men might keep without spoiling, and that by
mutual consent Men would take in exchange for the truly
useful, but perishable supports of Life.41
With the invention of money, "men solved the basic economic
problems of the state of nature."42

Although the state of

nature experienced an overabundance of goods, money
eliminated this to some degree because it allowed men to
accumulate more goods than they immediately needed.
Furthermore, Locke was able to justify inequality in
property among men because labor produced more money.
more someone worked, the more property they would

40. Locke, Second Treatise, 42.
41. Ibid., 47.
42. Goldwin, 449.
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The

accumulate, and, thus, the more money they would earn by
selling their excess property.

By agreeing to make gold and

silver valuable (money), men promoted inequality within the
state of nature:
Men have agreed to disproportionate and unequal
Possession of the Earth . • . by receiving in exchange
for the overplus, Gold and Silver • • • This partage of
things, in an inequality of private possessions, men
have made practicable out of the bounds of Societie
• • • by putting a value on gold and silver.43
Thus, cultivation of land and money were combined in the
evolution of Locke's political man.
Locke placed great importance on the combination of
labor of land and money.

This combination makes increase

possible, which Goldwin accepts as the "central theme of
Locke's political theory."

Without man's cultivation of the

land combined with money, nature would not be able to
provide the conditions in which the increase of mankind
would be fulfilled.44

Farmers increase what is available to

other men by producing crops through the cultivation of
land.

In order to protect the private property of

individuals, now able to accumulate more than their
immediate needs, men institute government.
Government, considered the "final step in the long
process of the liberation of man's powers of increase from
the restraints of nature," provides three things necessary

43. Locke, Second Treatise, 50.
44. Goldwin, 451.
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to preserve property: an established law, a judge to
determine differences according to the law, and the power to
support and execute the decisions of a judge.45

The

established law will be accepted as "allowed by common
interest to be the Standard of Right and Wrong, and the
common measure to decide all controversies between them. 11 46
The judge will reverse the possibility within the state of
nature that "Men being partial to themselves, Passion and
Revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much
hear, in their own Cases • • • to make them too remiss."47
once men enter into political society, they consent that
government will have the power to enforce the rulings of the
judges.

Locke explains man's consent:

For being now in a new State, wherein he is to enjoy
many Conveniences, from the labour, assistance, and
society of others in the same Community, as well as
protection from its whole strength; he is to part also
with as much of his natural liberty in providing for
himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the
Society shall require; which is not only necessary, but
just; since the other members of the society do the
like.48
These three things are accepted by all men who agree to make
a compact to enter into political society in order to better
"preserve himself his Liberty and Property. 11 49
When the compact is made, and government created, a
distinct break from the state of nature is established.

46.
47.
48.
49.

Locke,
Ibid. I
Ibid. I
Ibid. I

Second Treatise, 124.
125.
130.
131.
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Men

enter into civil or political society when the break is
made. For Locke, political society occurs
Wherever therefore any number of Men are so united into
one Society, as to quit every one his Executive Power
of the Law of Nature, and to resign it to the publick
• • • he authorizes the Society . . . the Legislative
thereof to make Laws for him . . • the Execution
whereof, his own assistance.SO
When men have reached the point in the state of nature where
they can accumulate more property than fulfills their
immediate needs, through the use of money, government is
created and instituted.

Established for the protection of

private property, government includes an established and
accepted law, a judge to decide cases concerning the law,
and the power to enforce the decisions of the judge.
By putting Locke's property theory into the language of
contemporaries and ascertaining the intentions of past
authors, Locke's property theory is given a foundation.51
Locke's theory arises from his belief in natural law and a
state of nature and the seventeenth century movement of the
concept of property towards the justification of personal
liberties.

Because property is the motivating factor in

Locke's movement from a state of nature to a state of
political society, it is a defining feature of man.

In

fact, property "seems to give the political quality to
personality."52

While man can separate himself from his

50. Ibid., 89.
51. This method is supported by Sampson.
52. Laslett, "Introduction," 116.
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property, he assocrates his freedom, equality, power to
execute the law of nature, and consent to negotiations with
other men to his personal goods.53

As a result, man can

alienate his personal property which he associates with
natural rights although he cannot alienate himself.

When

man alienates his personal property by consenting to a
government which will limit some of his natural
liberties, he gives birth to political society.

53. Ibid.
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Chapter Three
Tyrrell and Locke as Natural Law Theorists:
Similarities and Differences
Writing at almost the same time as Locke (and about the
same issues of property) James Tyrrell expounded his ideas
in Patriarcha non Monarcha.

Tyrrell's work is similar to

Locke's because he wrote it to refute Filmer, incorporated
ideas of natural law, and based it around the origins and
institution of private property.

Patriarcha non Monarcha

was a significant political work of the exclusion crisis.
Although he does not mention his name, Locke refers to
Tyrrell in his First Treatise by writing of "the Ingenious
and Learned Author of Patriarcha non Monarcha."1

Locke

makes this reference after stating that ideas of succession
and primogeniture in relation to property need not be
detailed because they had been "fully related" in Tyrrell's
book.

Laslett explains that even though the above is the

only direct reference to Tyrrell made by Locke, "the
parallel passages between it and Locke's noted in this
edition show how close the two men were."2
David Wootton places a great deal of emphasis on his
conviction that Locke wrote with Tyrrell in mind.

He

explains it is a "fact that every single one of the central
themes of the Second Treatise would arise naturally out of a

1. Locke, First Treatise, 124.
2. Laslett, "Introduction," 70.
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consideration of Tyrrell's Patriarcha non Monarcha. 11 3
Basing his argument on the idea that Locke "almost
certainly" wrote the Second Treatise after Patriarcha non
Monarcha was published in 1681, and that there is no
evidence that Locke influenced Tyrrell's work, Wootton
claims that "almost all the principles that we think of as
being distinctly Lockean are in fact borrowed by Locke from
Tyrrell."4

Partly based on his date for the authorship of

the Second Treatise, Wootton presents the most forceful
secondary argument for a direct connection between Locke and
Tyrrell.
Laslett, who first dated the Two Treatises as an
exclusion tract, written long before the Revolution which it
was assumed to justify, Laslett disagrees with Wootton's
dating of Locke's work.

According to Laslett, Tyrrell and

Locke wrote their works at the same time:

"Exactly the same

decision was taken at exactly the same time, with very
similar results on his final text in refutation of Filmer,
by his friend James Tyrrell."5

Following this argument,

Locke and Tyrrell wrote independently of each other with
similar results concerning natural law and property theory.
Even though Laslett argues for the independence of the two
men, he gives credit to Tyrrell for being the innovator of

3. David Wootton, "Introduction," Political Writings of
John Locke (New York, New York: Penguin Group, 1993), 77.
4. Ibid., 83.
5. Laslett, "Introduction," 73.
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the labor theory of value.6

Tyrrell's claim for originating

this theory, which helps to explain Lockean man's transition
from a state of common property to private property, must be
considered when anybody argues for any originality in the
Two Treatises.

Even if Patriarcha non Monarcha did not

predate the Two Treatises, any claim to originality which
Locke's work provokes must take into consideration the very
similar dating and ideas presented by Tyrrell.

Even if

Patriarcha non Monarcha did not influence the political
theory found in the Two Treatises, both Locke and Tyrrell
were natural-law theorists who argued that men were born
with a right to their freedom, that the state of nature was
peaceful, that property is a major reason for man's
evolution towards political society, and governmental powers
are granted by individuals.
Tyrrell and Locke both incorporated into their
arguments that men were born with a right to their freedom.
For Locke, this argument was the basis for his entire
conception of the state of nature.

In this state, men

enjoyed stewardship of their natural rights, given by God.
Tyrrell also advances the idea that men are born with and
retain a right to individual freedom.

5. Laslett, "Introduction," 73.
6. Ibid. , 7 4.
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He explains,

If they do not like the Government they live under, the
world is wide enough, and they may remove themselves
elsewhere: for I cannot think that the positive Laws of
any Government do oblige any man in Conscience . . •
And if one man may do this, why not more, and so on to
an indefinite number?7
Tyrrell argues that all men are entitled to change the
conditions under which they live, as dictated by their
consciences.

Men should not defer from their consciences

past the point where they are "convinced the thing commanded
is more than indifferent in its own nature, and conduces to
the good of Mankind in general, or of the whole Commonwealth
in particular."8

In other words, if a man is commanded to

extremes of action (such as taking another man's life by
order of his sovereign) the right to his freedom entitles
him to disregard this order if it is not beneficial to his
fellow men or to his country.

Whether presented from a

state of nature viewpoint (Locke) or a viewpoint that
accepts existing conditions (Tyrrell), both men argued that
men were born with the right to their freedom.
Unlike Locke, Tyrrell depends upon historical
references for examples of the argument that men are born
naturally free.

Tyrrell refers to the historical example

that

7. Tyrrell, 87.
8. Ibid.
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this notion of a native Allegiance (was not] known to
our Saxon Ancestors, since they counted no man an
absolute subject until he was sworn in the Tourn or
Court of Frankpledge, and was entered into a decanary
or Tything.9
According to Tyrrell, man is guided by his personal freedom
until the institution of government, after which he consents
to accept the government's authority.

However, even after

man temporarily forfeits his freedom to the authority of the
government, he can retain that freedom by moving to another
country to change unsuitable living conditions imposed by
the government.
Tyrrell pushes his belief that men are born with the
right to freedom to its natural conclusion.

He accepts the

premiss that men only need obey their patriarchs until the
age of nonage (twenty-five years old) when they will be able
to take care of themselves.

Upon the acceptance of this

premiss, Tyrrell declares
that those that first instituted Government in any
Country, have no necessity expressly to promise or
engage for the Subjection and Obedience of their
Children, or those who should succeed them.10
Even though men have a natural right to their freedom, once
people enter into society they should follow the contracts
of their ancestors and not destroy or alter their government
without very good cause.11

In the final analysis, Tyrrell

believes, no man is "obliged to the Acts or Agreements of

9. Ibid., 87-88.
10. Ibid., 77.
11. Ibid.
92

their Ancestors in the state of Nature farther than it
conduces to their benefit or preservation."12
Tyrrell accepts that all men are born with a natural
right to their freedom, start to enjoy this freedom when
they reach nonage, and cannot lose this right.

According to

Wootton, Tyrrell was the first natural law theorist to argue
for all of these conditions.

Locke agrees with Tyrrell in

all of these respects:
A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to
the Arbitrary Power of another; and having in the State
of Nature no Arbitrary Power over the Life, Liberty, or
Possession of another, but only so much as the Law of
Nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and
the rest of Mankind; this is all he doth, or can give
up to the Common-wealth.13
This passage reveals Locke's belief that man cannot lose his
right to freedom once given by nature to government.

Man

cannot lose his natural freedom to government because he can
only consent to a government that does not enroach upon his
right to self-preservation.
As late seventeenth century natural law theorists,
Locke and Tyrrell also believed that men were born into a
state of nature which was essentially peaceful.

That it was

peaceful is shown by man's ability to "establish and
identify private property rights."14

As Locke shows,

individual men can appropriate private property from

12. Ibid., 75.
13. Locke, Second Treatise, 135.
14. Wootton, 81.
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property given in common by God through the addition of
their labor.

Tyrrell's Patriarcha non Monarcha reveals the

same labor theory of value.

Accompanying the labor theory

of value in each man's political theory are the natural law
limitations of need and spoilage on appropriation.
Property was originally given by God in common to all
of mankind.

Man then appropriated this common property into

private property because of their interest in selfpreservation.

As Tyrrell explains, "all things being

exposed to all men . . . they did not belong to this person
more than to another."15
their needs.

Men were able to use property for

However, man's use of property was limited

what Tyrrell terms the "first natural law
Pinnacle of Reason."

this

Locke describes the first natural law

as the natural law limitation of immediate need.

Tyrrell

describes the first natural law (a sort of Golden Rule):
"Not to do to another that which I would not have done to
myself in the same Circumstances. 11 16

Tyrrell proceeds to

derive an argument from this law that no other man should
attempt to deny any other man their interest in property
because every man is interested in his own selfpreservation.17

by

The natural law limitation of immediate

need is only reasonable, "For he that leaves as much as

15. Tyrrell, 109, 2nd pagination.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 109-110, 2nd pagination.
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another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at
all. 11 18

Thus, for Tyrrell and for Locke, the beginning of

man's appropriation of private property was stirred by his
interest in his own self-preservation.
After man began to appropriate property for his selfpreservation, property became subject to natural law
limitations of spoilage and of immediate need.

Property

became subject to spoilage limitations because excess
property any man appropriates will only become a burden to
him and deplete the available resources of other men.
Tyrrell explains the reason for a spoilage limitation:
that the people do neither need nor desire those
superflous things that others doe, there is no need of
enclosing or appropriating any more Land than they
really make use of, more being but a burthen to them.19
The limitations of immediate need and spoilage which Tyrrell
and Locke endorse restrain man from an unlimited
appropriation of property in a state of nature.
Despite the impossibility of unlimited appropriation in
a state of nature, man is able to appropriate his private
property because he mixed his labor with what was originally
common property.

When man produces private property by

mixing his labor with common property he is producing the
labor theory of value.

Described in Patriarcha non

Monarcha, the labor theory of value is as follows:

18. Locke, Second Treatise, 33.
19. Tyrrell, 113, 2nd pagination.
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since the owner hath possessed himself of this land,
and bestowed his Labour and Industry upon it, and that
the other hath no right to any more of the products of
the earth than that may serve for the subsistence of
himself and his Family, and that there is more around
but where he may procure himself the like necessaries
if he please, he hath no right to take away this land
from the owner without his consent, since he hath
the same right to this Field as the other hath to his
cottage or Garden.20
As this passage shows, the labor theory of value establishes
the laborer as the undisputed owner of the property he mixes
with his labor.

In the work of Locke and Tyrrell, the labor

theory of value acts within the confines of natural law
limitations to provide a foundation for man's appropriation
of property from the property given by God in common.
Locke argues that men institute goverment as a
protector of private property once they have appropriated
property through the labor theory of value.

Although

Tyrrell is in conflict with Locke because he argues that
government is instituted by men as an answer to regulating
an expanding population, he does accept that government is
instituted by men.

Men are responsible for the powers

government possesses because they are responsible for the
institution of government.

In fact, "the powers of

government are based entirely on powers transferred to them
by individuals, and governments have no rights that are
particular to them."21

Locke believes all men are born with

20. Ibid., 112, 2nd pagination.
21. Wootton, 80.
96

the right to defend their freedom because they are born
entitled to their freedom.

To defend their natural freedom,

men must "judge of, and punish the breaches of that Law in
others. 11 22

To judge and punish others, men establish

government and instill it with the power to make and execute
laws "as the publick good of the Society shall require. 11 23
Although Locke presented the argument that men transfer
powers to the government, it may have been Tyrrell who
was the first to grasp the possibility of treating
governments as having rights no different in kind from
those of individuals in a state of nature, while
insisting those rights were not . . • unlimited.24
According to Tyrrell, the power the people possess in their
ability to punish the king is evidence that they instill the
government with its power.

Tyrrell describe this belief:

the Power of the people to resist and punish kings, in
which I shall say no more, than that a Prince who is
subject to be so punished, is not really a king, in the
sense that the word king ought to be understood, since
a king is properly one that hath no Superior, and
consequently is not capable of Punishments; all
punishments as I said before, being properly the
effects of a Superior, over an Inferior.25
Because people have instituted government and instilled it
with its powers, they are superior to the agents of the
government.26

22. Locke, Second Treatise, 88.
23. Ibid., 89.
24. Wootton, 80.
25. Tyrrell, 116, 2nd pagination.
26. Tyrrell's insistence that the people are over the
government reveals that he is not an absolute monarchist.
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In essence, people in a state of government are living
within both a state of nature and political society.

Locke

explains that the Executive Power is what "might be most
subservient to the publick good. 11 27

Tyrrell agrees with

Locke and argues that people have the choice of following
the government or not following the government.

He writes,

we should allow this way of compulsion to the People,
it will follow that both the King and the People do
still live in a natural liberty, or meer state of
nature.28
When people have the option of following the government
which they instituted and granted powers to, they are
ultimately only bound by natural law.

Once men agree to

institute government, they grant government the
responsibility to act as a judge between men.

Government is

granted this power because men need a judge to replace the
freedom from and equality to everyone else that men enjoyed
in a state of nature.

Nevertheless, even under government

people remain their own final judge, as natural law
dictates.
Both Locke and Tyrrell believe that property predates
government.

For Locke, the reason that property is created

is the protection of private property.

If property must be

protected, and government is instituted to be that
protector, then property must predate government.

27. Locke, Second Treatise, 167.
28. Tyrrell, 132, 2nd pagination.
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Tyrrell

is more blatant in his statements meant to clear up "this
great difficulty which hath puzzled some Divines, which is
prior in nature, Propriety or civil government. 11 29

He

simply explains
it is apparent, Propriety, understood either as the
application of natural things to the uses of particular
Men, or else as the general agreement of many men in
the division of a Territory, or kingdom, must be before
Government, one main end of which is to maintain the
Dominion of Property before agreed on.30
On the surface of their political theories, Locke and
Tyrrell appear to be mirrors of each other.

Each man

incorporates into his writing the ideas that men are born
with a right to freedom, are originated in a state of nature
which is essentially peaceful, are able to appropriate
property because of the labor theory of value, and are able
to grant government its powers after the creation of
property.

In all of these ideas, the two political

philosophers reveal their stance as natural-law theorists of
late seventeenth century England.

Locke and Tyrrell refuted

Filmer and his historical arguments while including issues
of liberty vital to the time when they were writing.
Yet profound differences remain between the political
theories of Locke and Tyrrell.

While both men agree that

man is born with a right to freedom and to consent to the
instituion of government, they disagree as to what

29. Ibid., 16, 2nd pagination.
30. Ibid.
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constitutes membership into government.

Tyrrell ultimately

takes a more realistic stance about the basis of membership
in a polity.
While Macpherson would have us believe that there was a
major break between Locke's state of nature and state of
political society, Locke clearly sees the law of nature as
binding in both states.31

However, Locke does not accept

that government replaces the state of nature or is
automatically inclusive of all men.

Instead, he believes

that government is bound by the law of nature and is
accepted only when people reach an age of majority.32

In

contrast to Tyrrell, Locke believes a return to the state of
nature is always an option.

He writes,

For a Man, not haveing the Power of his own Life,
cannot, by Compact or his own Consent, enslave himself
to anyone, nor put himself under the Absolute,
Arbitrary Power of another, to take away his Life, when
he pleases. Nobody can give more Power than he has
himself; and he that cannot take away his own Life,
cannot give another power over it.33
As this passage illustrates, because men do not have
unlimited natural rights, they do not have the power to
grant government power to supersede natural law.

People

cannot be subject to a government which supersedes the

31. See the appendix (below) for Macpherson's
interpretation.
32. See the appendix (below) for Tully and ShaderFrechette•s interpretations of Locke's work, which reveal
that government is guided by man's foundation of rights in
natural law.
33. Locke, Second Treatise, 23.
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rights they enjoy in a state of nature:
the Conquered, or their Children, have no Court, no
Arbitrator on Earth to appeal to. They then may appeal
• • . to Heaven, and repeat their Appeal, till they
have recovered the native Right of their Ancestors,
which was to have such a Legislature over them, as the
Majority should approve, and freely acquiese in.34
Unlike Locke, Tyrrell accepts the existing government
as replacing the state of nature and as a very inclusive
institution.

Also unlike Locke, Tyrrell would accept

absolute governments as legitimate because men can be
compelled to give up their personal rights under some
circumstances.

The strongest example he provides is of a

captor and slave, similar to Locke's conqueror and
conquered:
Thus a Slave and Argiers though it is the occesion of
his servitude his being taken Prisoner, yet the true
Cause of his becoming a lawful Servant to his taker,
does not proceed from his conquering him, that he shall
be dismiss'd of his Fetters, or Imprisonment, upon
Condition he will serve faithfully and not run away.37
Thus, Tyrrell will accept a contract for slavery within the
confines of government.

If this type of contract is

accepted, then the natural law limitation of someone not
being able to surrender their right to freedom is rejected.
If this right is rejected, then the road to absolute
government is open as a possible and much larger extension
of an individual contract for slavery.36
34. Ibid., 176.
35. Tyrrell, 122, 2nd pagination.
36. Notice, however, that even in slavery a person has
a contract. Ultimately, it is the individual's choice,
although limited by circumstance, to become a slave. After
all, slavery is usually considered to be better than death.
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While Tyrrell accepts government as a replacement for a
state of nature, necessarily inclusive of every man who owns
property, Locke will not consider government as inclusive of
anyone who has not made that choice after coming of age.
While Locke and Tyrrell concur the legitimate authority of
any goverment is founded upon consent, they do not agree if
government accepts men as born subjects.

If men have to

consent to the authority of government, everyone has to
accept that individual freedom must predate the institution
of government.

If individual freedom predates government,

as a corollary, men cannot be born as subjects of the
government.
Locke expresses this corollary in his Second Treatise,
where he states that while people "conclude they are
naturally Subjects as they are Men," governments "understand
it otherwise. 11 37

Government does not accept a child as a

born subject because it does not want to admit the child to
privileges of that country.38

Presenting an argument of

nonage, Locke explains that each man is under his father's
guidance, and not his government's, until "he comes to Age
of Discretion" when he is at liberty to choose "what
Government he will put himself under; what Body Politick he
will unite himself to."39

According to Locke, because men

37. Locke, Second Treatise, 117, 118.
38. Ibid., 118.
39. Ibid.
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are more a subject of their parents than of their
government's until the "Age of Discretion," they are not
born as subjects of their government.
In contrast, Tyrrell does not believe that government
does not accept men as born subjects.

Instead, he believes

that laws consider men to be born as subjects.

Tyrrell

explains, by positive laws "there is a native Allegiance due
by the Laws of divers Countries precedent to any Oath."40
Unlike Locke, Tyrrell believes that government accepts men
as born subjects.
Locke and Tyrrell also disagree as to what entitles
membership to political society.

On one hand, Tyrrell

believes that all goods carry membership to society with
them.

He states that any man who holds land or goods is

"bound to obey" and "likewise to maintain" government
because
it is just and reasonable that those that claim under
such first possessors, should, if they like to enjoy
the Lands or Goods, perform the Conditions annexed to
them
once the institutors of government tied the possession of
goods to the maintenance of the government.41

According to

Tyrrell, possession of land or goods is not the only thing
that entitles membership to society.

Even people who do not

own land or goods should accept the responsibilities of

40. Tyrrell, 87.
41. Ibid., 86.
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membership to society because they also "enjoy the common
benefits of the government. 11 42

Tyrrell accepts both

proprietors and non-proprietors as members of society, which
includes their responsibility to maintain the government.
Locke disagrees with Tyrrell because he will not accept
that proprietors of land or goods are bound to maintain
their government.

This disagreement reveals that Locke is

more radical than Tyrrell.

Locke would accept that

proprietors of the land have given their tacit consent to be
members of society because they enjoy governmental
protection of their land and liberties.43

However, Locke

makes a distinction between tacit consent and express
consent.

Express consent puts beyond any doubt that man is

"a perfect Member of that Society, a Subject of the
Government. 11 44

Tacit consent does not involve any express

statement of membership in a government but reveals an
agreement to maintain that government while the person
enjoys its privileges.

Locke explains,

The Obligation any one is under, by Virtue of such
Enjoyment, to submit to the Government, begins and ends
with the Enjoyment; so that whenever the Owner, who has
given nothing but such a tacit Consent to the
Government, will, by Donation, Sale, or otherwise, quit
the said Possession, he is at liberty to go and
incorporate himself into any other Commonwealth, or to
agree with others to begin a new one.45

42.
43.
44.
45.

Ibid.,
Locke,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

87.
Second Treatise, 119-120.
119.
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In addition, people who do not own property, even though
they enjoy the "Priviledges and Protection" of a
government's laws are not "a Member of that Society" unless
they have given their express consent to be members.46
Locke does not include proprietors or non-proprietors as
members of society, unless they have given their express
consent to be so, which means they do not have a continuing
responsibility to maintain government.

Locke's exclusion is

radical because he does not portray government as an
institution which men must obey.
While Tyrrell accepts anyone enjoying the priviledges
of government to be members of that government, Locke
establishes a criteria of the need for express consent for
someone to become members of society.

Locke's criteria

accepts landholders as members of society who have given
tacit consent which will end when they no longer enjoy
governmental privileges over that land when that land no
longer belongs to them.

For both Locke and Tyrrell, men

will no longer be members of society only when the
government violates their right to self-preservation,
whether they are landholders or not.
The express consent criteria which Locke presents in
the Second Treatise will keep individuals from giving as
much of their liberty to government as Tyrrell will allow.

46. Ibid., 122.
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This criteria limits what actions man may be held
accountable for, so that he can never be held accountable
for accepting an absolute government.

If man has limits for

what he can be held accountable for, his actions are
necessarily limited.

Locke explains the need for self-

preservation will always precede man's responsibility to
government:
the first and fundamental positive Law of all
Commonwealths is the estblishing of the Legislative
Power; as the first and fundamental natural Law, which
is to govern even the Legistlature it self, is the
preservation of the Society, and (as far as will
consist with the publick good) of every person in it.47
In contrast, Tyrrell believes man must fulfill the
responsibility he is assigned by government.

Tyrrell's idea

that man is held responsible to government echoes Tully's
socialist interpretation of Locke's work.48

However,

Tully's critique undermines man's individual rights under
government, especially to property, and as such, can be used
to highlight Tyrrell's rather than Locke's position.

Like

Tyrrell's argument, Tully's interpretation revolves around a
necessity of governmental regulation over men.

In Tyrrell's

writing, government is portrayed as an institution which men
must obey.
Even more vital to the political theories than the
distinction of whether man is ultimately responsible to

47. Locke, Second Treatise, 134.
48. See the appendix (below) for Tully's
interpretation.
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government, is the contrast between Locke and Tyrrell's
breadth and definition of property.

Because each man holds

a different opinion why government was created, Locke places
a greater importance upon property.
While Locke sees the creation of government as
necessary for the protection of property, Tyrrell sees the
creation of government as a result of an expanding
population.

As land is appropriated and utilized to its

fullest extent, Tyrrell explains,
there will presently arise a necessity of division of
lands in the first place; and of Trade abroade, in the
next; or else the People must either discharge
themselves into their neighbours territories, or live·
by robbing, or playing the Pyrates upon their
neighbours.49
The stress that a large population puts upon a limited
amount of available land creates the need for a government
to keep order.

Tyrrell contends that government must make

"laws to maintain this Propriety and punishments ordained
for them, that disturb it. 11 50
In contrast, Locke argues people do not necessarily
overpopulate the land that is available for their
appropriation.

None of the three main interpretations of

Locke consider overpopulation as the reason for the
institution of government and Locke explicitly denies this
reason in the Second Treatise.

He explains,

49. Tyrrell, 113, 2nd pagination.
50. Ibid., 114.
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Labour, in the Beginning, gave a Right of Property,
where ever any one was pleased to imploy it, upon what
was common, which remained, a long while, the far
greater part, and is yet more than Mankind makes use
of .51
Although he accepts that land was appropriated to a great
extent, Locke will not accept that the land is overpopulated
because common property still exists.

In agreement with

Macpherson's analysis of his work, Locke claims government
came into existence to protect property after men consented
to the use of money, which allowed them to appropriate
property beyond their immediate needs.52
The distinctions between Locke and Tyrrell's beliefs in
the natural right to freedom and their breadth of property
is highlighted by Tyrrell's assumption that the creation of
political society eliminates all previous property rights.
Wootton interprets Tyrrell's work to mean that personal
relationships are replaced with legal relationships once
man institutes government.SJ

On the other hand, Locke's Two

Treatises revolve around the idea that political society is
created to protect natural property rights rather than
eliminating them for rights determined by the government.
Following this distinction, the possessive
individualist critique of Locke's work, which states that
there is a major break between a state of nature and a state
of political society, seems more appropriate for Tyrrell's
51. Locke, Second Treatise, 45.
52. Ibid., 45.
53. Wootton, 85.
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work.

Locke's definition of property, which includes both

property in one's self and one's rights, holds in both a
state of nature and in political society.

In contrast, when

Tyrrell refers to property, his discussion considers
property as a right of ownership, which is guided by
governmentally determined laws rather than by laws of
nature.

Tyrrell's discussion of property relies on a break

between a state of nature and political society;

Locke's

discussion needs a smooth transition from a state of nature
to political society.

Tim Harris illustrates the difference

between Tyrrell's and Locke's definitions of property in a
seventeenth century context:
property in the late seventeenth-century was a complex
concept, possessing various layers of meaning. The
term could be used in a narrow sense meaning goods
and possessions, as it was • . • by the Whig James
Tyrrell . . • Yet property could also refer to anything
which might be peculiar or proper to one person, to
anything which might be said to enjoy the possession of
by private right. Thus, John Locke could argue that
men enjoyed a property in their
life and liberty, as
well as estates.54
While Locke's definition bridged the economic and the
ideological, reflecting material goods and ideal benefits,
following the continuing seventeenth century trend,
Tyrrell's discussion of property does not.55

As Harris

explains, Tyrrell regards property as material goods, and

54. Harris, "'Lives, Liberties, and Estates,'" 220.
55. See the introduction for its discussion of the
evolution of the concept of property in seventeenth-century
England.
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does not extend it to ideal benefits.

Thus, the possessive

individualist critique might be more to analyze Tyrrell
because he insists that governmental laws replace a man's
natural law limitations, which are fundamental in Locke's
property theory.
Furthermore, while both Tyrrell and Locke accept the
labor theory of value, only Tyrrell accepts occupancy as a
right to property.

Tyrrell has even been criticized for

being confusing in mixing arguments of labor with
occupancy.56

Ashcraft suggests that Tyrrell may have taken

this approach because he took the defensive in the nature of
property rights and did not want the Whigs to appear as
Levellers.

As a result, his argument from occupancy makes

his theory appear as "a wholesale endorsement of existing
property relations, whatever their form or social
utility."57

On the other hand, Locke relies solely on the

mixture of a man's labor with property to create ownership.
Therefore, Locke's political theory appears more consistent
and without possibilities of conflict.
Both Locke and Tyrrell accept that property had
originally been held in common as a gift from God.

The

Whigs had been pushed to this position by their acceptance
of natural law arguments, needing to demonstrate that men
were entitled to their property rights because they had

56. Ashcraft, 251.
57. Ibid., 282.
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originated in a state of nature.

In Patriarcha non

Monarcha, Tyrrell explains that occupancy "confers a Right
in the state of Nature to such things as are meerly
necessary for a mans subsistence. 11 58

Like labor, occupancy

is subject to natural law limitations (such as need,
subsistence) in a state of nature, laying a foundation for
property rights.

Unfortunately, through his historical

references, an argument for property rights from occupancy
only confuses the issue.

Tyrrell's historical references

and analogies justify Ashcraft's statement that he attempted
to justify existing property relations.

For example,

Tyrrell claims that
the Ancient Germans, from whom our Saxon Ancestors
descended, and of which nation they were a part, never
knew what belonged to an absolute despotick power in
their Princes. And after the Saxons coming in, and the
Heptarchy having been erected in this Island, the
Ancient form of Government was not allowed.59
As this passage reveals, Tyrrell is far from denying the
legitimacy of an absolutist government.

Instead, Tyrrell

simply insists the English never experienced an unlimited
government.

He writes,

the government of the West-Saxons which was that on
which our Monarchy is grafted was not despotical, but
limited by Laws, that the king could not seise mens
lands or goods without Process • • • [in addition] as
there is no man that is but moderately versed in the
history, and Laws of his Country, but very well knows;
and that this opinion of Englands being a limited
Monarchy is no new one, but owned to be so by our
kings themselves.60
58. Tyrrell, 65.
59. Ibid., 149.
60. Ibid., 150.
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Because Tyrrell differs from Locke in accepting an argument
from occupancy as a foundation for property rights, he can
be presented as a defender of absolutist governments; at the
very least, he does not deny that these governments can
legitimately exist, though they have not historically
existed in England.
Tyrrell attempts to redress how private property
originated from common property in Patriarcha non Monarcha.
Tyrrell, while trying to support existing property
relations, takes some aims to distance himself from the
people, "the rabble or the disordered multitude."61

For

example, he argues that only individual adult males have to
consent to political authority for the authority to be
accepted:
it be esteemed a perfect Democracy . . . where only
free men, or at their own dispose, and such who were
supposed first to have by their meeting together
instituted this Government • . • I see no reason why
there should not be looked upon as representing the
whole promiscuous body of the people.62
Tyrrell offers the historical example of Athens, "which all
must grant to be so," as a democracy which only needed the
consent of males who had the opportunity to hold property to
assume its political authority.63

Using historical

arguments to justify his theory, Tyrrell attempts to move
away from representing the people as a whole.

61. Ashcraft, 305.
62. Tyrrell, 74.
63. Ibid.
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By doing so,

while Tyrrell believes private property arose from the
common, he has to neglect the role of original common
property because he stresses the importance and role of
property holders instead of every man's ability to
appropriate property for himself.
At the opposite extreme, Locke devoted his Second
Treatise to the evolution of mankind as a whole from a state
of nature towards the institution of government as a
protector of every individual's natural property rights.

As

the interpretation given by Shader-Frechette demonstrates,
Locke's work is dependent on the division of the original
common into private property.

The Two Treatises is not an

attempt to defend existing property relations, as Tyrrell's
work is, but an explanation of why every man has natural
property rights, both economic and ideological, that must be
protected.

Locke links his political theory to every man's

individual rights, not just the landholder's rights.

In

contrast, Tyrrell argues that property in common means as
much as what a man can use.64

In essence, common property

as the original form of property is Tyrrell's justification
that no man can take the natural right to sustenance from
another man because all men originally had the right to take
their own property from the common.

Nevertheless, Tyrrell's

acceptance of the original common is nothing

mar~

than a

64. Daly, 90. Also, Tully's interpretation of what the
English common meant to Locke can be applied to Tyrrell.
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negative consent which men follow in a state of nature.
This negative consent changes when men agree to
governmentally determined laws, replacing the laws of
nature.

He explains his acceptance in Patriarcha non

Monarcha, involving the argument that occupancy leads from
common to private property:
a Property of occupancy or the personal possession of
and applying it to the use of one or more men while
they have need of it, may very well consist with
community, and is absolutely necessary to the
preservation of mankind.65
As this passage shows, Tyrrell advocates that when common
property is divided into private property by rights of
occupancy (giving theater seats as his example), men
necessarily agree that their right to preservation has been
served.

As a result, men will not debate the other man's

right to the property that man occupies.

By giving a

negative consent, man believes his own right of occupancy
will not be challenged.

The original common property did

not provide "an absolute positive, or unalterable communion
of every man pro indiviso" because, if it did, "the Products
of the earth could have contributed nothing to the ends for
which they were designed by God viz: the preservation and
Propagation of the species of Mankind."66

In Tyrrell's

opinion, if man was originally in a primitive state of
communism, holding all property in common, their best

65. Tyrrell, 99, 2nd pagination.
66. Tyrrell, 109-110, 2nd pagination.
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interests of self-preservation would not be served.67
On the other hand, Locke--and all major interpretations
of his work--accepts that there was a primitive stage of
communism within the state of nature.

Predating the

institution of government, Locke's stage of communism
enjoyed common property.

This common property would be

appropriated through the labor theory of value into private
property.

The men who appropriated from the English common

enjoyed the natural right to self and were limited by
natural law restrictions of spoilage.

While Tyrrell agrees

that men in a state of nature are entitled to selfpreservation and limited by natural law restrictions in
their attempts at appropriation, he will not accept that man
ever lived in a primitive stage of communism.

In providing

a critique of the progression of property rights in defense
of existing property relations, Tyrrell accepted arguments
from history.

These historical arguments advanced the idea

that the English knew a history of monarchy limited by the
consent of the people, rather than a background of
communism.

Tyrrell does not adequately explain what form of

social organization man experienced while holding property
in common, if they did not experience communism.

On the

other hand, Locke did embrace man's existence in a state of

67. Although Tyrrell agrees with Tully's interpretation
of Locke in many respects, he does not in arguing that there
could not have been an original primitive form of communism.
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nature (a theoretical construct), where he enjoys property
in common.

Locke's critique of man's evolution of property

rights is not as realistic as Tyrrell's because he was much
more systematic in explaining a state of nature which never
existed.

Locke's theory is more abstract; Tyrrell's more

historical.
Locke's insistence that government exists to defend
property rights controlled by natural law and to guarantee
man his freedom is a radical break from Tyrrell's arguments
in Patriarcha non Monarcha.

Despite their similarities in

arguing that man is born with a natural right to freedom,
grants government its powers, and arises from a peaceful
state of nature which experiences the labor theory of value,
their striking contrasts lead to profound differences in
property theory.

While Wootton may claim that "Tyrrell's

Patriarcha non Monarcha was the immediate cause of the
Second Treatise" upon a sound argument, and Tyrrell himself
would state that "whoever writ it [the Two Treatises] .
agreed perfectly with my conceptions in Patriarcha non
Monarcha," the two political works contain drastic
differences because Tyrrell was more realistic.68
In an attempt to distance himself from the people as a
whole while defending existing property relations, Tyrrell
presented a more real world approach than Locke.

In

contrast, Locke's more abstract, systematic approach was
very revolutionary in nature.

Although both men accept
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patriarchal origins of the state, Locke is the only one that
would not entertain any ideas for justification of unlimited
monarchy.

Tyrrell provides a sharp example, that of slave

and captor, which might produce an unlimited monarch.
Tyrrell attempted a more practical explanation of political
theory than Locke, relying upon both arguments from history
and arguments based on natural law.

On the other hand,

Locke used only natural law arguments to provide
justification for man's right to freedom and appropriation
of property as a means of self-preservation.

Locke was

eventually accepted as the master innovator by relying
solely on arguments from natural law, but Tyrrell's work was
more relevant to the time in which it was written.

68. Wootton, 60.

Quoted in Gough, 597.
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Conclusion
John Locke and James Tyrrell were political theorists
who reflected the issues of the exclusion crisis, when
modern political parties were starting to form.

The Two

Treatises and Patriarcha non Monarcha were distinctly
Whiggish.

Locke and Tyrrell wrote against the assumed Tory

spokesperson, Sir Robert Filmer.
Filmer's Patriarcha, published at least forty years
after it was written, suited the Whig-Tory debates perfectly
because it presented an argument for absolute monarchy.
Filmer derived the necessity of absolute monarchy from an
interpretation of Genesis which stressed that the world's
goods were originally given by God to Adam and that these
absolute property rights had descended to the present
monarch.

Filmer's interpretation of the Bible, centering on

the Fifth Commandment, also allowed for an innovative
patriarchal theory, where fatherly and kingly power were the
same, and not just analogous.

Using examples of biblical

history, Filmer's Patriarcha was representative of the
standard Tory position of supporting absolute monarchy as a
way of providing order to late-seventeenth century England.
Locke and Tyrrell went to great pains to refute Filmer.
Property issues, which had first been taken up by Filmer
because he believed Englishmen considered them as their
greatest liberty, became a major focus of each response.
During the seventeenth century, which experienced the first
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legal definition of property in print and an evolution of
the term to denote both economic and ideological rights,
property became the major focus of political debate.

After

each side presented its political stance, the Whigs have
since been viewed as defenders of property rights against a
Tory party which defended absolute monarchy.

However, the

writings of Locke, Tyrrell, and Filmer defend the position
that each party felt it was attempting to defend the
established Church and State.
In attempting to refute Filmer, Locke and Tyrrell moved
from relying on historical examples to natural law.

Rather

than offering an historical interpretation of the Bible,
which Filmer did in Patriarcha, Locke and Tyrrell used
natural law as a basis for their political theories.

Their

political theories stress that man is born with the natural
right to freedom, evolving from a peaceful state of nature
towards instituting government for the protection of
property.

By not centering on historical examples, the

natural law theories of Locke and Tyrrell could not be
proved incorrect.

Although they may not have admitted it at

the time, they helped to establish the validity of abstract
political theories while avoiding historical debates they
would lose.
Ultimately, despite the many similarities between The
Two Treatises and Patriarcha non Monarcha, Tyrrell revealed
himself as a more practical political theorist than Locke.
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Although both men agree that private property is
appropriated from the original common, Tyrrell also accepts
occupancy as a right to private property.

By accepting

occupancy as a right to private property, Tyrrell defends
existing property conditions, including the fact that he
does not deny the possibility of a legitimate absolute
government.

In contrast, Locke denies that absolute

government is ever legitimate and proposes a positive
community of property where every man is entitled to
property rights.

On the other hand, Tyrrell does not

present a positive community of property rights but rather a
negative community where individuals have their rights
because other men do not protest against what that man holds
as private property.

Also, Tyrrell considers all men,

whether they hold property or not, as members of society;
Locke only accepts property members as having given a tacit
consent to fulfill the responsibilities of government, but
this responsibility is only lasting with an express consent.
In several respects, Tyrrell and Locke differ in terms of
their property theory.
While Tyrrell's property theory is not now considered
as the equal of Locke's, it probably seemed more convincing
to his contemporaries.

When his contemporaries, both Whig

and Tory, feared possible results of the succession
controversy, Tyrrell defended existing property conditions.
Although he would not accept that every absolute government
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was illegitimate, he attempted to show that proprietors and
non-proprietors alike hold responsibilities to government.
Although he believed that all Englishmen hold responsibility
to their government, which replaced the state of nature,
Tyrrell also advanced the idea that only men who had the
opportunity to hold property need consent to a government
for its authority to be valid.

In advancing this idea,

Tyrrell distances himself from the people as a whole,
speaking particularly for men of property.

His conception

of property, in fact, reveals who he speaks for because it
does not follow the view which would become common in the
late eighteenth century of property as both an economic and
ideological conception, but rather a purely economic one.
Most importantly, he used historical examples to support his
arguments.

Although an importance has been placed on the

Whig movement from historical arguments to natural law,
Tyrrell incorporates them both into his work.

This

incorporation suggests that he bridged historical political
realities with abstract political philosophy.

A political

theory which defended existing property relations, not
extending property rights to ideological rights for
everyone, while bridging historical political realities with
abstract political philosophy would have been convincing to
Tyrrell's contemporaries: an audience of Tory and Whig
parties which were still elitist.

That theory is exactly

what Tyrrell presented in Patriarcha non Monarcha.
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Locke, on the other hand, whether Laslett or Ashcraft's
dating of the Two Treatises is accepted, wrote with a more
universal purpose in mind.

While Tyrrell was a spokesman

for the Whig party at the time of the Exclusion Crisis,
making his writing more historically important for that
period, Locke's purpose extended beyond that of his friend;
he acted as Whig spokesman for a radical, though not
republican, wing of the party which was writing for
posterity as well as their own cause.

Locke's purpose has

since drawn attention as a Whig spokesman for future
generations.

His political theory, although based around

terms that he does not adequately explain (natural law,
state of nature, government by consent, etc.), leaves out
historical examples completely.

His elimination of

historical examples, coupled with his dual conception of
property, establishes Locke as a Whig natural law theorist
that extended beyond the exclusion crisis.

His property

theory reflected the seventeenth century trend of turning
property into a concept which covered both economic and
ideological liberties, as the varied interpretations of his
work reveals.

Locke wrote for a universal audience; Tyrrell

wrote for his contemporaries.
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Appendix
Major Interpretations of Locke's Theory of Property:
Possessive Individualism, Justification of the English
Common, State-Welfare Capitalism
Although it is clear that Locke's theory of property
focuses on man's movement from a state of nature to
political society, certain ambiguities can be found in the
Second Treatise.

The major ambiguity which can be found

with Locke's property theory is that he gives two ambiguous
definitions of property, neither of which is very specific.
This ambiguity has led to differing interpretations of which
economic system Locke supports:

the "possessive

individualism" described by C.B. Macpherson, the socialism
of the English common argued for by James Tully, and a type
of land-use planning detailed by Kirstin Shader-Frechette.
Spanning the extremes from Tully to Macpherson, Locke can be
found to support most property theories because, as Laslett
suggests, if historical texts are treated how the authors
want, "we can prove just what we like from them."1

In

addition, the presence of "two distinct conceptions of
ownership in his (Locke's] thought," which "are, in many
cases, conflictory," allows for different possibilities in
interpretation.2
Locke's property theory can support the idea of
possessive individualism.

This idea was presented by C.B.

Macpherson in his now-classic The Political Theory of
1. Laslett, "Introduction," 91.
2. Schwarzenbach, 141.
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Possessive Individualism, Hobbes to Locke.

Possessive

individualism is a concept based on the assumptions "that
man is free and human by virtue of his sole proprietorship
of his own person, and that human society is essentially a
series of market relations."3

In short, possessive

individualism describes men as greedy in nature, who have a
goal of unlimited appropriation of capital.

Macpherson

admits the concept "has a large, if ambiguous, place in
Locke's political theory."4

This admittance lends credence

to the belief that his theory can be proven if an author
specifically looks for justification of it within Locke's
writing.

In fact, Macpherson expands, justification for

possessive individualism "appear in the theories as
uncertain mixtures of assumptions about fact and assumptions
about right" which "tend to be beneath or beyond the notice
of both philosophical and historical critics."5

After all,

assumptions are sometimes more important than explicit
statements; if someone can be fairly sure that Locke
intended to support something, it is more risky to avoid the
attempt than to make it.

The warnings given in the

introduction to The Political Theory of Possessive
Individualism are ample evidence that no one should read any
interpretations of what Locke's theory supports without
3. C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theorv of Possessive
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (London, England: Oxford
University Press, 1962), 270.
4. Ibid., 2.
5. Ibid., 4.
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reservations.
In a study of possessive individualism, Locke's theory
of property must be understood before his theory of
political government can be understood.

This condition is

essential because possessive individualism is constructed
around an argument that in a state of nature individuals
were created in the form of market man, predating political
government.6

Once given life as a market man, each

individual is free from any relationship he does not enter
into with his own interest in mind.

As a result of only

acting on their own behalf, individuals make society "a
series of relations between proprietors" where political
society is nothing but a "contractual device for the
protection of these people and their relationships."7
The theory of possessive individualism accepts natural
law as man's guide in a state of nature, conceding that
man's appropriation of property is limited by immediate
need, spoilage, and the use of man's own labor only.8

Other

than these three limitations, individual appropriation is
justified by man's natural right to self-preservation and
the use of his own labour.

Because each man is entitled to

appropriation within the state of nature, what was
originally given to mankind in common is divided among men
as personal property.9
6.
7.
8.
9.

This division leads to possessive

Ibid., 269.
Ibid.
Ibid., 201.
Ibid.
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individualism's disregard of communal ownership.

Before man

has entered into political society, according to the theory
of possessive individualism, natural law has led to the
individual appropriation of the common into personal
property.
Although natural law is a guiding force in a state of
nature, when man eventually enters into political society,
natural law will no longer be binding on man's actions.
According to the theory of possessive individualism, Chapter
Five of the Second Treatise must be read as removing the
"'bounds of the Law of Nature' from the natural property
right of the individual."10

After a reader accepts this

condition, Locke's work can be read as an argument for a
right of unlimited appropriation, which surpasses the three
limitations placed on man within a state of nature.
Natural law is binding within a state of nature only
until the introduction of money.

After man has put a value

on money, a commercial society without civil society becomes
possible.

Money signals both the end of unappropriated land

and the removal of the limitations of natural law.
signals of money's influence are found in the Second
Treatise:

10. Ibid., 199.
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The

This I dare boldly affirm, That the same Rule of
Propriety (viz.), that every Man should have as much as
he could make use of, would hold still • • • had not
the Invention of Money, and the tacit Agreement of Men
to put a value on it, introduced (by consent} larger
Possessions, and a Right to them.11
This passage shows that money signals the end of natural law
because once money is introduced, man is able to purchase
more goods than what he immediately needs.
In addition to eliminating the natural law limitation
of appropriation to immediate needs, the use of money
eliminates the natural law limitations of spoilage and the
use of man's labor only.

According to the theory of

possessive individualism, appropriation beyond the limits of
natural law takes on a positive virtue because it assumes
that an increase by one person (signalling an increase in
the whole} will either benefit or not make anyone's position
any worse.12

Furthermore, a new relationship is created by

appropriation beyond the limits of natural law; a wage
relationship.

A wage relationship is created because a man

will be able to purchase another man's labor through the use
of money.

This relationship eliminates the limitation of

the use of man's labor only because one man can buy another
man's labor.

For the theory of possessive individualism, "a

commercial economy in which all the land is appropriated
implied the existence of wage-labour."13

11. Locke, Second Treatise, 36.
12. Macpherson, 212-214.
13. Ibid., 217.
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Following this

theory, a commercial economy, even without the existence of
political society, indicated the end of natural law
limitations because of the use of money.
Although Macpherson believes that his discussion of
Locke's property theories restored to them the meaning they
"must have had for Locke and his contemporaries," the theory
of possessive individualism is not without its faults.14
The theory insists that natural law limitations do not
extend past the introduction of money into political
society, that men are greedy, and that governmental property
regulation should be ignored.

The insistence that natural

law limitations do not extend into political society is
misleading because, after claiming that the Fifth Chapter of
the Second Treatise is a justification that the laws of
nature do not extend into political society, Macpherson
writes "the whole theory of property is a justification of
the natural right not only to unequal property but to
unlimited individual appropriation."15

So, even though

natural law limitations may not extend into political
society, natural rights arising from natural law are the
justification for individual appropriation after the
institution of money.

In other words, natural law and

natural rights do bridge the state of nature and the state
of political society.

In a reading of Locke's Two

14. Ibid., 220.
15. Ibid. I 221.
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Treatises, natural law must be seen as essential to Locke's
property theory because it shifted the argument away from
history and to man's obligation to natural law.

Any author

who does not clarify Locke's reliance on natural law is
neglecting something vital to Locke's writing.

One of

Macpherson's problems is that, although he makes this point,
he does not clarify it, leaving the role of natural law in
political society uncertain in the theory of possessive
individualism.
Despite problems in the theory of possessive
individualism, Macpherson's work does provide many strong
points.

One of the theory's strengths is that it attempts

to put Locke's property theory within the framework of the
time it was written.

For Macpherson, Locke's property

theory reveals the seventeenth century movement of property
definition from the ideological to the economic.

While

stressing the importance of property for economic theory,
Locke is also providing a vital ideological tool in
describing the evolution of political society and the
expanse of property, based on natural law.
Another strength of Macpherson's work is the drawing of
a division between those who own property and those who do
not, although this division is not explicitly stated in
Locke's work.

This division implies that people who own

land are the only individuals who can become full members of
society because they are the people most interested in the
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protection of property, the chief end of government.

This

idea reveals a deeper division of political society between
those who have a marked interest in government and those who
do not, which supports the strongest point of possessive
individualism; property theory must be understood, and is
essential, to understand Locke's political theory.
Although Locke may be considered as a supporter of
possessive individualism, James Tully contends that his work
stresses the justification of the English common instead.
Tully's A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His
Adversaries responds to Macpherson.

Tully focuses his study

on the argument that Chapter Five of the Second Treatise was
not written as a discussion regarding the origin of
property.

Rather, the chapter was written as a way "of

showing that his [Locke's] alternative to Filmer's Adamite
theory is practicable, chapter five is directed against
Filmer."16

Tully believes the origin of property was

described in the First Treatise where Locke attempts to
overthrow Filmer's "theological premiss" and establish
"natural law and man's obligation to it" so that private
dominion cannot be seen as absolutist.17

In his attempt,

Locke discovers that "property is right in common" and
"equivalent to dominion in common," in contrast to Filmer's
idea of the "'exclusive' private dominion" of Adam and his

16. Tully, 96.
17. Ibid. I 53.
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heirs.

Upon Locke's discovery, Tully develops a thesis

which argues that Locke's work is a justification of
property derivation from the English common.
Rather than an argument for unlimited appropriation of
property, Locke's work is a justification that everyone is
able to use different goods from the English common, but not
determine their use as part of their private property.
According to Tully, all men were granted "the common right
to use, not the common right to use".18

In addition,

although all men were granted this right, they were not
granted that right over all things, but only in those things
necessary to preservation.

Locke's "property or

right in common" is a "subjective use right" which means
that a person has "a right or moral power to something" but
not to ownership in that thing.19
To accept Locke's work as a justification of the
English common, a reader must assume that private property
was established after the institution of political society.
As Locke explains in the Second Treatise,
it was commonly without any fixed property in the
ground they made use of, till they incorporated,
settled themselves together, and built Cities, and
then, by consent, they came in time . • • by Laws
within themselves, settled the Properties of those of
the same Society.20
18. Ibid., 97. Notice in this quote that use is
written twice. Use can be both a verb and a noun. In this
quote, the first time that use is written is as a verb and
the second time it is written is as a noun.
19. Ibid., 60.
20. Locke, Second Treatise, 38.
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According to this passage, people consented to private
property after they incorporated themselves into political
units.

Further into the Second Treatise, Locke writes:

the several Communities settled the bounds of their
distinct Territiories, and by Laws within themselves,
regulated the Properties of the private Men of their
society, and so, by Compact and Agreement, settled the
Property which labour and Industry began.21
By presenting this second passage, Locke explains that
governments became regulators of property for the common
good.
Because individuals created private property after
instituting government, private property could not be
natural.

As Locke writes,

by the Labour that removes it out of that common state
Nature left it in, made his Property who takes that
pains about it.22
Although what goods would eventually become property existed
in nature, they did not become property until man interfered
by claiming them as his own.

After government is created,

the rights of property come into existence through
regulatory laws and "positive constitutions."23
According to Tully, the role of government in
regulating property is the focus of Locke's fifth chapter of
the Second Treatise.

Through governmental regulation,

"particularization of the natural common is possible."24

21.
22.
23.
24.

Ibid. I
Ibid. I
Ibid.,
Tully,

45.
30.
50.
100.
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When the natural common is particularized, its property
divided for different uses, each man is able to acquire the
means necessary for support and comfort by using the
property assigned for particular uses.

Because the common

consists of much more than just land, a reader must not read
"'property' as a term comprising unconditional rights over
land and so equate it with 'private property.'"25

Instead,

all goods in common must be considered as property, linking
them as objects which can be used for the good of all but
will not become private property.

Ultimately,

The fundamental and undifferentiated form of property
is the natural right and duty to make use of the world
to achieve God's purpose of preserving all his
workmanship. A commonwealth which arranges men's
actions accordingly is the complementary kind of
society.26
Property and political society, both creations of man, are
necessary in directing man's life.

Government, as the

regulatory agent of the common, is important because it
provides men with the property necessary for preservation.
One of the major weaknesses of Tully's interpretation
is that he is inconsistent in detailing any connection
between property and natural law in the Two Treatises.
fact, no connection at all is stressed.

In

Tully only briefly

refers to the very strong connection between natural law and
property.

He alludes to the connection by describing

Locke's property theory "as a natural right to exercise
25. Ibid., 124.
26. Ibid., 173.
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sovereignty over what is legally one's own."27

His allusion

is negated, however, when he claims that property is not
natural.

Although Tully emphasizes the fact that Locke had

to rely upon an explanation of property and equality
consistent with natural law, it seems highly improbable that
he would be able to do this if property did not exist in a
state of nature, his origin of political man.

One of the

major weaknesses of Tully's interpretation is that he is
inconsistent in detailing any connection between property
and natural law in the Two Treatises.
Tully's contention that political society predates
private property is another weakness which can be found in
his work.

This weakness eliminates the reason that man has

for entering into government; the protection of private
property.

Tully provides no other reason for the

institution of government as a replacement for a peaceful
life within a state of nature.

He merely argues that man

created government and then created the institution of
property which was regulated by the government.
Essentially, this is the same thing as saying that
government was created to preserve property which was going
to be instituted because the government would be able to
regulate it.

There is little difference in saying that

government is created for the protection of private property

27. Ibid., 172.
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rather than the regulation of property.

Either way,

according to Locke, government was created with property in
mind, and not as an institution separated from man's
interest in property.
Even if someone can accept Tully's conclusion that
government predates private property, this conclusion is
based on a misreading of the Second Treatise.

Tully's major

support for an argument that government predates private
property never states that government had been created.28
Instead, the passage suggests only that the people collected
themselves into "distinct Territories" and made "Laws within
themselves."

These laws were possibly laws of custom rather

than laws of government.

Also, collecting a group of people

into a territory does not constitute government.

Locke

tells us that a government needs an established law, a
judge, and the power to enforce the decisions of the judge.
At most, the passage Tully uses only contains an established
law of the three conditions.

The passage he uses most

likely argues that society, not government, was in place
when men first started to recognize property.

George Sabine

explains that English society and English government are two
different things, the second existing for the well-being of
the first.29

Perhaps in Tully's argument, individuals

entered into society, instituted property, and then created

28. Locke, Second Treatise, 38.
29. Sabine, 535.
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government.

According to Sabine, Locke "is nowhere clear as

to what precisely does arise by the 'original compact,'"
questioning whether society arises or government.JO

In

Tully's argument there was a compact and it may have led
only to society.
Resting between readings of Locke's Two Treatises that
contend he either justifies unlimited accumulation of
property or the English common, is an interpretation that
stresses his endorsement of welfare-state capitalism.

This

interpretation can be found in Kirstin Shader-Frechette•s
article, "Locke and Limits on Land Ownership."

Shader-

Frechette writes, although "Locke ought not be interpreted
in any doctrinaire, ideological way," his writings may
justify a "welfare-state capitalism that includes land-use
planning. 11 31

In essence, this interpretation opts for a

middle ground between a traditional capitalist analysis and
a socialist analysis.
A middle interpretation is more solid than either
unlimited appropriation or socialist interpretations because
it emphasizes the role of natural law in Locke's theory in
both a state of nature and political society.

It is unlike

the analysis of unlimited appropriation, which does not
"account for the moral demands of

Locke's 'Law of Nature'

30. Ibid., 532.
31. Kristin Shader-Frechetter, "Locke and Limits on
Land ownership," Journal of the History of Ideas 54 (April
1993): 201.
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and its eternal, rather than historical, character."32

In

contrast, a reading which supports welfare-state capitalism
insists that the law of nature does not end historically
with the transition from a state of nature to political
society.
A welfare-state interpretation of the Second Treatise
also differs from a socialist interpretation because of the
role of natural law in each.

In a socialist interpretation,

there is not a natural right to property in civil society.
In contrast, a welfare-state capitalist interpretation,
where natural law is found as a guiding factor in both a
state of nature and political society, stresses that people
are entitled to property because of their natural
rights.
In a welfare-state capitalist interpretation, private
property evolves from common property originally given by
God to mankind.

Because property was originally held in

common by all men, the state of nature was a form of
primitive communism.

Unfortunately, Locke does not define

the state of nature very clearly, leading many commentators
to miss the need to explain a transition from common
property to private property.

Locke does write,

I shall endeavour to shew, how Men might come to have a
property in several parts of that which God gave to
Mankind in common, and that without any express Compact
of all the Commoners.33
32. Ibid., 202.
33. Locke, Second Treatise, 25.
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A welfare-state capitalist interpretation of Locke's writing
accepts that private property, created before the
institution of government, arose from common property.
The basic justification for private property, arising
from common property, is the labour theory of value.
Accepted as virtually unchallengeable, this theory entitles
people to whatever they produce by their own labor.34
Rather than losing one's labor, mixing one's labor entitles
ownership for several reasons.

These reasons include that

it is efficient for appropriation to be based on labor,
people who labor are industrious and rational and deserve
the results of their labor, and that labor is often
responsible for a thing's value.35

Despite these reasons,

some portion of land value is not created by human labor.
As Locke explains,
if we will rightly estimate things as they come to our
use, and cast up the several Expenses about them, what
in them is purely owing to Nature, and what to labour,
we shall find, that in most of them 99/100 are wholly
to be put on the account of labour.36
Although 99/100 is a very high percentage of value owed to
labor, it is not an absolute debt.

When there is any land

that has some value not created by human labor, that land
cannot be appropriated and must remain in the common.37

Any

land left in the common will be subject to land-use-planning

34.
35.
36.
37.

Shader-Frechette, 202.
Ibid., 205.
Locke, Second Treatise, 40.
Shader-Frechette, 215.
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for the common good.
Even property that owes all of its value to labor has
restrictions placed upon it regarding possible appropriation
because of natural law.

Land and other property can only be

appropriated if there is enough remaining for others and if
it is put to productive use.

The only way that these

restrictions can be enforced is if property is regulated by
the government.38

Locke writes, "in Governments the Laws

regulate the right of property, and the possession of land
is determined by positive constitutions."39
According to the welfare-state capitalist
interpretation of Locke's writing, justification for
governmental regulation of property is natural law.

This

interpretation endorses the belief that the law of nature
continues into political society because the latter is
implemented to enforce the law of nature.

The power of

government cannot exceed the power of natural law,
For it being but the joynt power of every Member of the
Society given up to that Person or Assembly, which is
Legislator, it can be no more than those persons had in
a State of Nature before they enter'd into Society, and
gave up to the Community. For no Body can transfer to
another more power than he has iri himself .40
Because governmental power cannot supersede the power of
natural law, the restrictions of natural law hold for all
time, even with governmental regulation of property.

38. Ibid., 202.
39. Locke, Second Treatise, 50.
40. Ibid., 135.
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Natural law restrictions upon property act to counter
the economic and political power of the people who injure
others through their accumulation of property.

Unlike the

traditional capitalist interpretation, a welfare-state
capitalist interpretation of Locke's writing claims that
"Locke never denied the right to preservation or subsistence
as a consequence of the consent to money."41

According to

both theories, money allows for an inequality in property
among men and aids in the transition to political society as
a means of protecting those with property.

However, in a

welfare-state capitalist interpretation, unlike the
traditional capitalist interpretation, natural law is
eternal so that there is not an overemphasis upon change
from a state of nature to a state of political society.

On

the other hand, natural law is not considered as a guiding
force in political society under the traditional capitalist
interpretation.

As a result, in the traditional analysis,

an unlimited appropriation of goods under the protection of
government suggests that there is a marked difference
between a state of nature and political society.
In addition, under the traditional capitalist
interpretation no details are given considering that
extensive accumulation can only be justified if it benefits
others.42

According to Locke, "the great Law of Nature,"

41. Shader-Frechette, 40.
42. Ibid., 217.
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which holds in both the state of nature and political
society, is "Who so sheddeth Mans Blood, by Man shall his
Blood be shed. 11 43

Applying this rule to the appropriation

of property, no man will be able to appropriate property if
it hurts someone else because they will then have the law of
nature--revealed in established law--turned against them for
a redress of grievances.

Under governmental regulation, the

appropriation of property will be limited to only what will
maximize production and improve the conditions of mankind.44
Locke describes these regulations:
Yet this could not be much, nor to the Prejudice of
others, where the same plenty was still left, to those
who would use the same Industry. To which let me add,
that he who appropriates land to himself by his labour,
does not lessen but increase the common stock of
mankind.45
Supported by this passage, men cannot have access to
unlimited appropriation of property unless their
appropriation both improves and maximizes production while
not being detrimental to the conditions of other men.
These interpretations of Locke's Second Treatise, which
differ largely in their consideration of natural law and the
role of property in society.

Of the three, Macpherson's

possessive individualism, Tully's justification of the
English common, and Shader-Frechette's state-welfare
capitalism, Shader-Frechette's state-welfare capitalism is

43. Locke, Second Treatise, 11.
44. Shader-Frechette, 217.
45. Locke, Second Treatise, 37.
141

most accurate because it considers the role of natural law
most fully in man's evolution from a state of nature to
political society.

Only in a state-welfare capitalist

interpretation is natural law a binding force in both a
state of nature and political society.

According to the

theory of possessive individualism, there is a major
transition from a state of nature to political society where
the bind of natural law is broken.

On the other hand,

according to a reading of the Second Treatise which stresses
a justification of the English common, a natural right to
property does not exist in political society.
The three given interpretations of Locke's Second
Treatise also differ in regard to his property definition,
which contains a dual conception of material goods and ideal
benefits (also
property).46

categorized as stewardship and private
These descriptions are connected because men

are put in stewardship of their ideal benefits and can
consider their material goods as private property.
Stewardship, one of the dual conceptions, is linked
with ownership, where men possess something originally
obtained as a gift.

Examples of things that man is steward

to are his life, liberty, and natural freedom.47

All of

these gifts are given by God and man must act responsibly
with these gifts to show he is grateful to God for them.

46. Schwarzenbach suggests this alternate terminology.
47. Ibid., 146.
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The conception of stewardship suggests that property is part
of a person's being which must be guarded.

Government

becomes the conditional guardian of these gifts, which can
be considered man's natural rights, when man enters into
political society.

Because stewardship explains an easier

transition towards the establishment of government, it
reveals a problem in any attempt to reconcile possessive
individualism with Locke's writing.

While Macpherson's

theory stresses that there is a marked difference between a
state of nature and political society, the concept of
stewardship found in Locke's work reveals there is not a
marked difference between these two states because man is
steward of his natural rights in both.

Thus, stewardship

destroys one of Macpherson's major foundations in his
interpretation of Locke.

Stewardship, arising from man's

possession of his natural rights, helps lead to the
transition towards government as the protector of property.
Private property, the second of the dual conceptions,
describes something earned by one's own efforts and is
similar to the tangible goods portion of Locke's property
definition, which can include land.

Unlike property held in

stewardship, people can dispose of their private property at
will, without alienating part of their personal being.48
Private property is similar to the tangible goods portion of

48. Ibid., 148.
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Locke's property definition and can include land.

The

conception of private property within his work reveals that
Locke "intends to argue for a more extensive private
ownership" than Tully claims he does.49

People are entitled

to private property under government, destroying Tully's
argument that in political society people do not have a
natural right to property.

While destroying Tully's

argument, the conception of private property as a dual
conception of ownership highlights the economic portion of
Locke's definition of property.
Although contrasts between the three interpretations of
Locke's work can be drawn, especially regarding their
consideration of natural law and property, it is important
not to put too much emphasis on these distinctions.

The

importance of the differing interpretations hinges on the
fact that Locke's work can be demonstrated to support any of
them, because he was not specific in defining property,
natural law, a state of nature, or government.

Strikingly,

he provided a dual conception of property which leads to
confusion about what property theory he does support.

In

part because of the confusion surrounding Locke's dual
conception, in the final analysis only Locke's own judgement
can stand on what property theory he meant to justify.

As

there is no truly accurate way to interpret his theory, it

49. Ibid., 153-4.
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has been criticized as "incomplete, not a little confused
and inadequate to the problem as it has been analyzed since
his day."50
Despite the confusion, Locke has much to offer as a
political theorist.

Just the fact that his work has been

able to support so many interpretations reveals that his
work has a universal applicability.

More importantly, the

several interpretations of Locke's property theory
demonstrates that there is a deep interest in what Locke has
to say because his political theories are appealing to a
wide audience; from a socialist that interprets his work as
an endorsement for unlimited accumulation of property to a
scholar who interprets his work as an endorsement of a
socialist system.

50. Laslett, "Introduction," 120.
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